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A Survey of the Ontogeny of Tool Use:
From Sensorimotor Experience to Planning
Frank Guerin, Norbert Krüger, and Dirk Kraft
Abstract—In this paper, we review current knowledge on tool
use development in infants in order to provide relevant informa-
tion to cognitive developmental roboticists seeking to design artifi-
cial systems that develop tool use abilities. This information covers:
1) sketching developmental pathways leading to tool use compe-
tences; 2) the characterization of learning and test situations; 3) the
crystallization of seven mechanisms underlying the developmental
process; and 4) the formulation of a number of challenges and rec-
ommendations for designing artificial systems that exhibit tool use
abilities in complex contexts.
Index Terms—Developmental psychology, developmental
robotics, infant behavior, tool use.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS survey paper is targeted at researchers in artificialintelligence1 (AI) interested in pursuing a developmental
approach2 to achieving robust object manipulation competence
and basic tool use in their systems. The paper presents relevant
research from studies in developmental psychology (mostly of
human infants). In addition to reporting individual results, the
paper identifies core mechanisms we believe to be in operation
during the development of tool use in infants. Based on these
mechanisms we then present general recommendations, which
may be useful for those who wish to build artificial systems that
exhibit a similar development.
From a roboticist’s perspective, a central issue is how to reach
a point in development where planning complex actions with
objects is possible. Planning ability relies on a knowledge of
planning operators, which describe preconditions and post-con-
ditions of actions. How the knowledge of such operators de-
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1This paper will use the term artificial intelligence (AI) in the broad sense
of the discipline concerned with any type of intelligent information processing
in artificial systems, including as subdisciplines: cognitive robotics, computer
vision, and all areas within computational intelligence.
2We will not attempt to argue for the developmental approach here, as that
has been done elsewhere (e.g., [1]).
velops is a key issue for this paper. In the developmental psy-
chology literature, there are some constructs reasonably close
to planning operators, for example the sensorimotor schema [2]
and [6].3 A sensorimotor schema gathers together the percep-
tions and associated actions involved in the performance of a
habitual behavior. The schema represents knowledge general-
ized from all the experiences of that behavior. It also includes
knowledge about the context in which the behavior was per-
formed as well as expectations about the effects. We will later
refer to the parts of a schema as context, action, and effect. This
paper will trace the development of sensorimotor schemas from
their origins in the first months through to the point where they
represent sufficiently abstract knowledge that they can be re-
cruited for planning operations.
We take the perception–action perspective on tool use devel-
opment [5], which sees a continuous trajectory of development
from early exploratory interactions with objects and surfaces
through to more advanced manipulations, including tool use.
From this perspective, developments in perceptual and motor
skills are potentially very relevant to understanding the abili-
ties that precede tool use and might serve as foundations for it.
Therefore, this survey will also devote some attention to these
“precursors” to tool use. This is in line with the trend in modern
AI to shift the focus away from “high-level” cognitive skills
and more towards “lower-level” control of actions in the world
[7]. This is not a denial of the existence of high-level skills, but
rather a realization of the need to build them from low-level sen-
sorimotor skills.
Tool use is an interesting phenomenon because it is a very
obvious demonstration of intelligence, and it is relatively easy
to analyze due to its external manifestation. In addition, its
ontogeny is particularly interesting because it shows a de-
velopment from simple sensorimotor behaviors to behaviors
exhibiting the hallmarks of advanced cognition. In its simplest
forms, tool use requires no more than simple context-specific
sensorimotor knowledge, such as an expectation about the
effect of an action. In its advanced forms, tool use requires
knowledge of objects, distances, forces, and their interactions,
and the ability to manipulate some form of internal representa-
tions of these. Furthermore, it is surmised that this knowledge
of the physical world may be crucial as a foundation for more
advanced cognition [8]. Therefore, a study of the development
of this foundational knowledge, through tool use, would be an
important step towards understanding advanced cognition.
3The term “sensorimotor schema” comes from Piaget [2], but similar ideas
like “sensorimotor process” [3], “skill” [4], or “perception-action routine” [5]
are used by other psychologists. We use the term in a broad sense to capture the
general idea shared by these works.
1943-0604/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Conceptual diagram providing an overview of infant developments leading to tool use.
Developmental psychology does not yet have a complete
theory of cognitive development.4 Therefore, roboticists do
not have an abstract mathematical “theory of development”
they could apply to any task (contrast this with, e.g., Shannon’s
mathematical theory of communication [10]). In the absence
of such a theory, roboticists who wish to build systems that
develop in a similar way to human infants may need to follow
the same concrete tasks that human infants do. If a roboticist
builds a robot to follow an infant’s developmental sequence
of increasingly sophisticated tasks, then this increases the
chance that the roboticist may discover similar mechanisms of
development.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.5
1) It sketches the development paths along which sev-
eral examples of simple tool use may be acquired. This
means we describe a sequence of increasingly sophisti-
cated behaviors that lead to some examples of tool use.
This is valuable as it often reveals pathways that sim-
plify the acquisition of a behavior and intermediate com-
petences one might not have considered.6
2) It gives concrete examples of simple tool use and their
precursors. These simple tasks are good candidate tasks
4There exist interesting considerations of design principles connected to de-
velopmental processes (see, e.g., [9]) that can guide design processes. However,
a complete theory should account for developments in all domains; it should
explain how the same mechanism can develop different types of knowledge de-
pending on the environment it interacts with, and it should be detailed enough
to allow for the computer modeling of a complete longitudinal developmental
sequence.
5The first two points are purely from behavior, but the last two are delving
into the internal mechanism and, hence, are more speculative.
6This is similar to the way in which the fossil record can reveal pathways
along which complex organs developed, whereas in the absence of the fossil
evidence, the evolutionary development seems difficult to explain.
for experimentation with artificial systems because they
help to avoid the danger of attempting an overly ad-
vanced task (which might force a solution to be coded
in a nondevelopmental way).7
3) It gives some insight into how knowledge (of actions
and object relationships) may be represented; this
comes from our analysis of the sensorimotor basis for
such knowledge, which begins with subjective sensori-
motor experiences, and gradually becomes generalized
to capture more objective knowledge about the effects
of certain operations when applied in certain situations.
4) It gives some insight into general mechanisms of sen-
sorimotor development, and how they apply in the de-
velopment of tool use (see the list of mechanisms to-
wards the end of this section).
We capture our view of the ontogeny of tool use in humans
with the conceptual diagram of Fig. 1. The diagram shows two
parallel tracks of development. At the bottom is the “concrete”
track, which shows the development of sensorimotor schemas
observable in infant behavior. At the top is the “abstract” track,
which shows the parallel development of the underlying rep-
resentations used by the infant. In this paper, we will mainly
describe the “concrete track.” For the abstract track, we stress
that we know very little; psychology is mostly the study of be-
havior, and conjectures of cognitive models are quite limited at
the present time.8
The lower (concrete) track shows a directed acyclic graph;
each node represents a newly created sensorimotor schema,
(which corresponds to a new observable behavior arising at
7Nondevelopmental here means making use of hand-coded knowledge from
a human, as opposed to having the system learn for itself.
8For example, limited to isolated episodes or aspects development [11].
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this time) .9 The directed edges of the graph have the meaning
“is a necessary precursor”; i.e., the later behavior builds on the
previous one(s). Acquisitions are (mostly) accumulative, e.g.,
babies suck things less as they get older, but in general they
do not forget. Most behaviors we deal with can still be elicited
in older infants. For the concrete track, we can categorize the
behaviors as belonging to three consecutive and overlapping
stages (indicated by the overlapping curves), described as
follows.10
A. Behaviors Without Objects
This stage starts with the development of a small number of
innate behavior patterns, which are in general not linked to any
object. The vision and motor system become calibrated, leading
to the ability to grasp seen objects, which facilitates the transi-
tion to the next stage. In parallel with this, on the (upper) abstract
track, we have initially isolated fragmentary representations,
which function in limited environmental contexts; these develop
and become gradually connected (e.g., across different senses),
allowing for transfer of knowledge (see, e.g., Section V-B5).
B. Behaviors With Single Objects
In this stage, accidental events start a linking process between
action and object perception. This leads to specification and
branching of sensorimotor schemas concerned with single ob-
jects; their effects become increasingly predictable. In parallel,
extensive training data is generated on concrete object–action
experiences. This allows the abstract track to find connections
between similar experiences, and so to generalize across them;
this constitutes the beginnings of the construction of more gen-
eral object and affordance representations, which become in-
creasingly task independent (by virtue of the fact that they gen-
eralize across multiple tasks). We begin to have a generic and
powerful world model, which constitutes itself as an indepen-
dent entity shared by the different sensorimotor schemes. Unfor-
tunately, this internal world model is only indirectly deducible
from the observation of behavior and constitutes a big challenge
to roboticists (see [13]).
C. Object–Object Behaviors
Further branching and refinement of the schemas continues in
this stage, but the new element is that the sensorimotor schemas
are extended to deal with relationships among objects, which
deliver the basic units for tool use. Because schemas now nec-
essarily deal with relationships among objects, the representa-
tion of spatial locations and transforms within space begins to
be constructed (abstract track). Object representations become
elaborated to integrate parts of objects and different perspec-
tives, as well as physical properties influencing their interac-
tion. In the abstract track we also have some connected frag-
ments of representations, which may be reformulated to form
a new more general representation subsuming the old versions
9This graph has a strong similarity with Fischer and Hencke [12, Fig. 2].
10Our choice to group things in three stages is somewhat arbitrary, as it suits
the observations we want to describe; Piaget uses six stages [2], and Fischer
uses four [4], for the same period.
(the process of representational redescription [14]). In addition,
at this stage, simple examples of planning can already be ob-
served. The schemas are now usable in a wider variety of con-
texts, and their effects increasingly predictable; therefore, it is
possible to plan a sequence of actions while still maintaining
a high degree of predictability of the effects of such action se-
quences. These developments (on both tracks) are ongoing and
do not stop where our figure stops.
Perhaps the greatest mystery in cognitive development is un-
derstanding how practice with concrete tasks in specific situa-
tions leads to the development of more abstract general knowl-
edge of the physical world, such as improving representations
of objects and space. We can only give some small insights into
this in this paper, and to this end Fig. 1 also illustrates (with
dashed curves) links between the abstract and concrete tracks;
these links are bidirectional. To avoid clutter, only a few links
are shown, but in reality all representational fragments will be
linked to sensorimotor schemas.
In one direction (see Fig. 1, Link 1), representations may
be built up (or existing fragmentary representations linked
up) from the action of sensorimotor schemas; when a schema
acts in a variety of contexts, it discovers sensory abstractions,
which predict its success, and these abstractions are preliminary
representations (e.g., representations of shape for grasping,
see Section III-A). Such representations can immediately link
to actions, which can manipulate the represented object or
spatial relation. In the other direction (see Fig. 1, Link 2), more
advanced schemas make use of the newly formed representa-
tions, for example in their description of the context in which a
behavior may be performed, or its effects, or the control policy
followed during execution of the schema.
This development process (see Fig. 1) allows us to deduce
guidelines for how to set up an artificial developing system. In
particular, the developments on the concrete track are reason-
ably well studied and observable, allowing us to deduce some
of the mechanisms underlying them, as follows.
M1 (Repetition): Each schema seeks to repeat itself oppor-
tunistically (this explains play, see Section II-B), leading to
its own refinement, and also to the accidental discovery of
new effects in new situations (such accidental discoveries
can subsequently be intentionally exploited).
M2 (Variation and Selection): Actions are performed
with high variability in order to discover new results, and
understand the effects of parameter variations, and later
those results that give desired outcomes are selected.
M3 (Differentiation): Schemas are differentiated when an
unexpected result is sufficiently interesting to warrant its
own specialized schema. Motor differentiation changes the
schema’s action (motor control program). Sensor differen-
tiation changes the schema’s context and effect.
M4 (Decomposition): A single schemamay be broken into
a number of sequential chunks so that refinements of the in-
dividual parts can take place, as well as flexible reassembly
(see, e.g., Sections V-B1 and V-D); this can increase the
predictability and maturity of the schema.
M5 (Composition): Schemas can be composed to form
simple composite sequences or higher order schemas,
which control relationships among lower schemas.
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M6 (Modularization): Composite schemas may be ini-
tially crudely connected sequences, but can then be re-
fined by repetition, variation, and selection, to produce a
“smooth atom” [15], which could then be put under con-
trol of another (further composition).
We will give concrete descriptions of how these mechanisms
are exemplified through different behaviors in the course of the
paper. These mechanisms are crucial for the development of
planning competences. M1 and M2 are important for increasing
the predictive power of the schemas, and by means of M3–M6,
new schemas (planning operators) can be generated.
In this paper, we are not addressing the mechanisms under-
lying the development of the abstract track, but there is a need
for a mechanism that synchronizes the development of both
tracks:
M7 (Representational Redescription): When similarities
are noted among a set of sensorimotor schemas, a new
more abstract representation can be created, which can re-
formulate the knowledge captured in the former schemas
within a more generic framework.
The largest part of this paper is Section V, which goes
through examples of tool use and precursors. However, before
this, it is necessary to first cover some more general prelim-
inaries. Section II sets forth our perspective on the problem
of tool use and how competence develops. Section III gives
an overview of sensorimotor schemas (which is the unit of
knowledge we will use in analysis in this paper). Section IV
provides an overview of various perspectives on cognitive
development in order to explain the different psychological ap-
proaches and to put the later results in context. Section V is the
main part of the paper and presents the evidence from various
behavioral studies. Section VI briefly looks at developments
on the abstract track. Section VII reflects on these results and
draws conclusions relevant to cognitive roboticists.
II. THE PROBLEM OF TOOL USE
Tool use is an example of problem solving. It involves se-
lecting the right tool or tools, spatially arranging the right rela-
tionships between tools and target objects, and performing the
appropriate manipulations to solve the problem. The problem
may be solved by simple trial-and-error in the world, or by ad-
vanced planning. (Thus, we can consider planning as a special
case of problem solving). This section defines the problem and
outlines the techniques human infants (and some animals) seem
to apply to simplify the search for solutions.
We distinguish between 1) general problem-solving abilities
(such as planning and search techniques), and 2) domain-spe-
cific knowledge of specific actions’ preconditions and effects in
different situations (i.e., AI planning operators, which we call
sensorimotor schemas.) This section focuses on general abili-
ties while we will look at the development of specific abilities
in terms of sensorimotor schemas in Section V.
Section II-A looks at the size of the problem space and how
it can be reduced by various techniques. Sections II-B and II-C
look at research on infants’ competences in general problem
solving and planning, and how these develop. Section II-D looks
at the role of social learning in problem solving. Section II-E
sums up how the development of infant problem solving could
be important to cognitive roboticists.
A. Managing the Problem Space
Amathematical formulation of the complete problem in a tool
using scenario can consider all the degrees of freedom of the
actor, and the objects involved (typically a tool and a target ob-
ject, but possibly other objects as well). The spatial–temporal re-
lation between objects, which are to interact, is of prime impor-
tance; this can be described by a set of relative parameters [16].
First, to determine if an object is suitable as a tool for operating
on another object to attain a certain goal, the actor needs to mon-
itor, and possibly react to, changes in these relative spatial pa-
rameters [16]; this implies consideration of the objects’ shapes
and possible spatial relationships. Second, in order to use one
object as a tool on another, the values of these relative param-
eters must be appropriately controlled. One must also consider
whether these relative parameters [17] 1) must be produced or
maintained sequentially or concurrently (sequentially is easier);
2) require active monitoring for their maintenance; and 3) are
managed by direct contact or through the intermediate action of
an object. Furthermore, a consideration of required forces and
velocities is necessary (which are also parameters).
From this perspective, many tool use problems have a very
large problem space. In practice, there are a number of ways
in which the total degrees of freedom are greatly reduced,
by dealing with the problem space via smaller manageable
subspaces (as exemplified in the next paragraph). This happens
because infants (and other animals) tend not to tackle the whole
problem space to find a solution, but rather their search is
constrained by prior experience, habits, and knowledge. The
space reduction methods include 1) sequencing; 2) stereotypic
behavior; and 3) sensory abstraction.
First, tasks are usually solved by a sequence of actions, where
each step need only consider (and control) a limited number of
degrees of freedom. Consider a capuchin monkey who cracks a
nut by first transporting it to a large “anvil” stone, next retrieving
a suitable “hammer” stone, and then raising the hammer high to
strike the nut [17]. In total there are three objects being put in a
relationship, and the number of degrees of freedom is large, but
the sequencing of actions leads to a series of smaller problems.
It is not necessary to contemplate the relative positions of all
three objects; instead one may consider only a pair at a time. To
enact a sequence discovered perhaps by chance, coordination of
components does not require that the whole problem space be
considered at one time (see Section I, M5).
Second, within any step, the motor actions and the sensory
elements considered do not include all those available to the
animal, but are constrained by existing sensorimotor “units,”
which often manifest themselves as stereotypic behaviors. An
easily identifiable sensorimotor unit is the knowledge related
to any habitual behavior, for example the banging action
of an infant. This is what we called a sensorimotor schema
(see Section I and also Section III, associating perception and
action). Infants (and other animals) tend to constrain the actions
they try out on objects to a limited repertoire of stereotypical
behaviors [18], even though their motor apparatus has a far
greater range of possibilities. This restricts their motion, but
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they can perform their behaviors with high variation, so there
is a distribution of actions associated to each stereotypical
behavior. With the mechanisms of repetition (M1) as well as
variation and selection (M2), these schemas lead to a reason-
ably constrained exploration of the problem space, while still
allowing for less constrained exploration when desired [to
provoke new results, and lead to differentiation (M3)].
Third, sensory abstractions constrain the space; for example,
five-month-old infants use only depth and motion to deter-
mine object boundaries (and not color, for example), probably
because these have higher ecological validity [19, pp. 149].
This perceptual simplification means that such infants face a
“smaller” problem than adults in many scenarios, because it
is surmised that objects that have lost their depth boundaries
are not seen as objects [20], [21]. In terms of development,
these units of knowledge may be partially predetermined by
genetics, and/or composed by the organism from other units
and fragments (see, e.g., Section VI). This paper will sketch
this development where possible.
We have sketched the above strategies to facilitate the search
in the problem space. The fact that humans (or animals) typi-
cally do not consider the whole solution space means that they
will often arrive at suboptimal solutions, and this is to be ex-
pected in a developmental approach. When a solution is first
assembled, the animal will tend to perform component parts in
a habitual way (i.e., the way in which those components had
been performed before they were recruited to solve the current
problem), but over time these may be refined to be more ef-
ficient for the task at hand. However, an engineer considering
all degrees of freedom available to the animal may be able to
find a more efficient solution, which would not occur to the an-
imal. The cost of the animal’s approach is suboptimality, but the
benefit is tractability, because the search for a solution may be
intractable if all degrees of freedom are considered.11
From a robotics perspective, the infant system seems to start
with mechanisms that ensure rather simple state and action
spaces, which are then extended over time. Providing a rather
simple initial state space seems also to be reasonable in an
artificial developing system, and this might even be crucial
to making learning and development possible. This idea of
constraining the space can be implemented by imposing con-
straints [23], [24] or by allowing them to arise naturally as the
consequence of a simple learning algorithm [25].
B. Planning and Playing
In looking at infant behavior and development from a
“zoomed out” perspective, we could see three types of behavior
1) reflex; 2) play; and 3) problem-solving (these are also
overlapping waves). Reflexes seem to happen in early stages of
development and serve to bootstrap the development process.
Play could be described as an affordance-based activity, where
affordances of objects in the environment suggest certain be-
haviors. There is a close relationship between problem solving
and free play with infants seamlessly switching between the
two. Bruner states, “In play, ends are altered to suit means,
11Apart from tool use, the same strategy of degree of freedom reduction is
seen in pure motor control problems (see [22, Sec. 3.4]).
rather than means being altered to achieve an end held con-
stant, as in problem-solving [26].” Infants sometimes lack the
capacity to hold ends in mind, and so the means may take over
in some problem-solving attempts (e.g., lifting the barrier in
Section V-C5). Free play is an effective way for infants to learn
about the effects of actions and means–end relationships, so
it is an important part of the development of schemas. Play is
explained simply by the mechanisms of repetition (M1) and
variation and selection (M2), but given a large set of possible
activities, an important issue is to decide which actions to do
and which actions not to do; this is an area of growing interest in
the AI community under the heading of “intrinsic motivation”
[27]. In this section, we focus more on problem solving, but
also highlight some connections with play (see Section V-C8
for more on play).
Problem solving and planning are very evident in the second
year of development, and to a lesser extent before. These are
complex activities requiring task analysis, monitoring of the so-
lution, memory to retain goals and subgoals, organization of
successive attempts, and the use of discovered information to
guide further attempts [28]. This search of the space of actions
can happen via (at least) three mechanisms12: 1) simple forward
search; 2) forward search with heuristics; or 3) means–end sub-
goaling (discussed below). The first step in problem solving is to
choose a goal that is not immediately attainable. The simplest
case is where the goal is seen, such as an out-of-reach object.
Alternatively, it may be recently seen, such as an object that has
just been hidden. Sometimes the goal is unseen, but it may be
triggered by the sight of something that is often used as an ele-
ment in a procedure leading to the achievement of that goal; for
example, an infant sees a coat, which triggers the desire to be
taken outside. Finally, the goal may be internally triggered by a
physical need, such as hunger.
1) Forward Search: This is where actions are tried out in
the real world, in an effort to achieve the goal. This does not
require any mental simulation of future states or actions. It is
required that the infant have the ability to pursue a goal, and in
order to avoid exhaustive search of all possibilities, the infant
should have some knowledge of how to “use information about
the difference between what was achieved and what was in-
tended to guide subsequent activity” [28]. According to studies
cited by Willatts, newborns have these abilities, with evidence
of some goal directed search with hand to mouth in a limited re-
gion. With external objects, goal-directed behavior may appear
as early as three months; this was shown for shaking a mobile
hanging above a crib, furthermore these 3-month-olds were able
to hold a relatively complex goal in memory (the achievement
of a certain amount of shaking in a mobile) (see [28, and the
studies cited therein]).
2) Forward Search With Heuristics: Heuristics can give an
estimate of how likely a potential candidate action is to lead to
the goal. An example heuristic could be the reduction in distance
between a desired object and the infant; actions that the infant
expects will reduce this distance will be chosen in preference
to others. If forward search is used with appropriate heuristics,
it can lead to a very sophisticated problem-solving behavior,
12These are well known from AI [29, pp. 375–416]
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and could explain a great deal of the problem solving observed
in infants, even those behaviors thought to be the result of a
high-level representation involving mental simulation [28]. For
example, the use of a long stick to retrieve an out-of-reach object
could be accounted for by a trial-and-error search, with appro-
priate heuristics.
Heuristics may also aid in the search for the appropriate pa-
rameters for an action (for example, the force to be exerted on
an object). After varying a parameter, the infant may under-
stand if the variation is “going in the right direction.” Evidence
that such relationships could be deduced comes from [30] who
showed that by 15 months (and not before) infants can predict
object weight from size (evident from results on grasp develop-
ment); given that they only have experience of having lifted a
certain finite set of objects, they must interpolate for previously
unseen objects; this suggests that in general if they have suffi-
cient experience with the effects of some values of a particular
parameter or dimension (in perception or motor control), they
could interpolate for unseen cases. The kind of knowledge ac-
quired from such interpolation can help greatly in constraining
forward search for problem solving, where an action with vari-
able parameters is being used as a means; given a few trials, the
relationship between parameters of the action being applied, and
its effects, could be recognized, and so the range of search can
be narrowed considerably. This is an example of the mechanism
of variation and selection (M2), which allows the relationships
between initial conditions and effects to be studied.
3) Means–End Behavior: Here, one starts with the goal
and searches for a means to achieve it. The simplest form is
where a single means action makes the goal action possible.
An example is pulling a cloth in order to bring an object resting
on it within reach (where grabbing this object is the goal).
Simple means–end behavior has been described by Piaget
[2] as emerging at about 8 months. Willatts [28] showed a
transition from accidental retrieval to intentional retrieval from
6 to 8 months (see Section V-C3). Furthermore, by 9 months, it
was shown that infants can adjust the means action (cloth pull)
as appropriate to the goal, in situations where the goal may
be far or near. Willatts argues that the basic ability to perform
means–end behavior is present in the first 6 months, but only
appears for manual tasks between 6–8 months because the
infant has just acquired new manual skills and is learning about
their effects. In terms of sensorimotor schema, their contexts
(preconditions) and effects (postconditions) are becoming
refined via this practice.
What is special about means–end behavior here is that it gen-
erally involves a composition (M5) of schemas, one acting on
the means object and one on the goal, and so the composi-
tion implicitly captures a relationship among these objects, and
through practice the infant learns this relationship (i.e., learns
situations where the composition works or does not); the pat-
tern here is one of fortuitous success, followed later by un-
derstanding (see Section V-C3). This type of accidental dis-
covery of relationships among objects could explain the emer-
gence of relational play (i.e., using object–object relationships,
see Section V-C3) shortly thereafter. While means–end plan-
ning is straightforward in robotics (given well-defined planning
operators), we do not find many examples where the accidental
discovery of means–end sequences leads to the development of
the individual planning operators themselves (see [31] for an
exception).
More complex means–end behavior involves working back-
wards from the goal to find a series of subgoals, which will lead
to eventual solution. This requires mental representation of in-
termediate states (whereas forward search can in principle be
done without such representation). Forward search can also be
done with mental representation where courses of action are
tried out mentally before being tried in the world. As noted
above, forward search can alsomake use of sophisticated heuris-
tics to guide the search, and in observing an infant solving a
problem by a sequence of actions it may not be possible to de-
termine if forward search or means–end analysis is being used
during that particular episode; Willatts [28] states that he does
not know of any empirical way of distinguishing the two alter-
natives.
4) Affordance-Based Activity Within Planning: In addition
to simulating forwards (by heuristic search) or backwards (in
a hierarchically directed means–end fashion) there is also evi-
dence to suggest that some fragments of solutions in the middle
of a possible sequence may be so compelling that children feel
obliged to use them. A study of older children (average age of 32
months) by Cox et al. [16] required them to move a disk (with a
duck, a swan, a frog, or a fish painted on top) from the center of a
circular table towards the boundary (which had a trough painted
blue for water). In order to move the disk the children were re-
quired to use a cane with a hooked shape at the end. They were
presented with the cane in a variety of different starting orienta-
tions. Despite the fact that the children could have easily swept
the disk to the edge of the table in a single motion, on 79% of
the trials the children chose to enclose the disk in the hook, and
children almost always chose to move the object closer to them.
This suggests that the fact that the hook fitted very well with
the shape of the disk triggered a fragment of an action sequence
that was too compelling for the children to ignore, even though
it did not lead to the most efficient solution to the problem. This
is an example of where problem solving and affordance-based
play are not separated. Affordance-based play has also been im-
plemented in robots in robotics [32]–[37] (see Section III-C).
Learned affordances are used in planning [33], but the affor-
dance-based play is not mixed with planning.
In summary, for complex problems, it seems plausible that
a child may see the scene and trigger the simulation of many
fragmentary sequences of actions. These may be actions from
the current state forwards, or from the goal backwards, or parts
in the middle of a sequence; these will then be assembled in
some sequence, which is expected to achieve the goal. This may
happen at runtime or in advance if sufficient knowledge of ac-
tions and effects is available. The important message for cog-
nitive roboticists is that there is evidence that basic planning
mechanisms are applied at very early stages of development
(and hence are likely to a substantial degree innate) but that the
library of planning operators is very limited in the beginning,
and this partly explains why not much planning is observed in
younger infants.
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C. Domain-General Abilities in Problem Solving
The above described the main strategies infants seem to use
in planning, but did not address how general planning abilities
develop over time. Willatts holds that there are no major discon-
tinuous changes in strategy, but he does describe some of the
developments in underlying generic cognitive abilities, which
would lead to improved search in older infants [28]. These in-
clude the following.
1) Memory of what has already been tried: This has been
tested with search tasks, to see that the infant does not
return to a location that has already been searched. This
shows improvement from 14–16 months of age [28].
2) Backtracking if there has been failure: This has been
tested in a task involving nesting cups. Children from
18–30 months were unlikely to backtrack to a previous
configuration, but from 30–42 months there was a signifi-
cant increase in this behavior [28].
3) Memory of goals:Younger children may get distracted and
forget the goal, the potential depth of their search is there-
fore limited [28].
4) Organization of search: If the order of search is organized
systematically it means there is no need to remember what
has been tried. For example, infants seem to try easy ac-
tions first, and harder ones later. The evidence for this
organized strategy increases from 12–24 months, but it
may well be innate, and not very apparent in 12-month-
olds simply because they only have simple actions in their
repertoire [28].
5) Inhibition of errors (for example, the tendency to repeat a
previously successful action, in the wrong situation [38]):
This does seem to improve throughout infancy, but task-
specific effects are very strong.
It is not clear if the delay in these developments simply re-
flects limitations of the maturing brain, or if it is important to
ensure that a high variation in testing of sensorimotor schemas
happens before more sophisticated planning is attempted. In
any case, cognitive roboticists might be reminded not to try
to trigger complex planning with sensorimotor schemas at too
early a stage of development but to focus on the grounding of
these schemas.
D. A Brief Note on Social Learning
Most examples of tool use we cover rely on social learning,
either directly or indirectly (for learning precursors to the
behavior). In most socially learned examples of a skilled
behavior, there is an element of imitation and an element of
self-exploration. For example, in infant learning of self-feeding
with the spoon, the infant initially imitates the behavior demon-
strated by the adult, but the result is quite crude, and the infant
shows little understanding of the various components in the
sequence of behavior. Over time (several months), in addition
to observing adults, the infant experiments with the constituent
parts and refines the behavior, eventually producing an effec-
tive behavior. There is also an ongoing interaction between
social learning and exploratory learning; there is a limit to how
much a learner can advance through learning socially from a
master demonstrating a skill, and when the learner does further
self-exploratory learning, he or she subsequently can profit
more from the same demonstration (because he or she now has
a greater understanding of the relationships among relevant
parameters in the constituent parts).
In this paper, we focus on the self-exploration part of the
problem rather than the social learning. A great deal of liter-
ature exists on social learning in infancy [39]–[41] and would
warrant a survey of its own. In a robotics scenario it is relatively
easy to provide input from a teacher. For example, a human can
take hold of the robot’s arm and perform an action with it, or
the robot can be given a handcrafted example of the correct mo-
tion to solve a certain tool use problem in a specific situation.
After this, the challenge is to make the robot adapt this appro-
priately in new situations. This requires the robot to develop
an understanding of the relevant parameters and relationships
among them in the task, as well as appropriate representations,
which is what we focus on in this survey.
E. Conclusion for Cognitive Roboticists
From the preceding subsections we can draw some important
conclusions. First, Section II-A suggests that constraints on the
complexity of state and action spaces can be designed at the
beginning of development, and can help to bootstrap learning
and development (and avoid the posing of unreasonably large
learning tasks). Second, for domain-general aspects, we have
sketched in Section II-B the main strategies (e.g., forward
search, means–end), which appear to be in use in early infant
planning. It seems that the basic (domain-general) infrastructure
for planning is in place relatively early on, but that the library
of (domain specific) schemas (planning operators) is relatively
empty, so that not much planning will be observed; this library
becomes filled during ongoing development by increasingly
accurate sensorimotor schemas. Finally, the domain-general as-
pects of development include the gradually developing abilities
listed in Section II-C (for example, memory); it is possible that
following such a schedule of development is advantageous so
that the younger infant is presented with simpler more manage-
able problems (much like degrees of freedom are constrained
in early tool use; see Section II-A).
Based on this, planning would seem to be relatively easy to
emulate in a robot as it matches techniques, which are already
mature in AI. However, a proper grounding of schemas in sen-
sorimotor experience seems to require a long development with
a great deal of experiences of the causes and effects of sen-
sorimotor schemas, which must be learned by testing them in
many different contexts (by playing). This poses a real challenge
to roboticists because it requires a huge amount of meaningful
experiences; this is still difficult to achieve by means of real
robots nowadays due to unstable hardware and limited sensors
(see Section V-B5), and inadequate representational structures
for interpreting and assimilating the data. The remainder of this
paper will mainly focus on the development of these (domain
specific) schemas (i.e., Fig. 1, lower track).
III. BACKGROUND ON SENSORIMOTOR SCHEMAS
The previous section discussed problem solving and planning
abilities; this section will focus on the planning operators them-
selves (here called sensorimotor schemas, see Section I). We
look at schemas in psychology and neuroscience, and closely
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related constructs, and also the efforts to formalize them com-
putationally.
A. Piaget’s Sensorimotor Schemas
The sensorimotor schema has its origins in Piaget’s work
[2].13 It includes knowledge about the context in which an
action can be performed as well as expectations about the
effects. The schema can also encompass some higher level
planning knowledge because from Piaget’s stage IV onwards
(see Section IV-B) there exist higher level schemas, which
coordinate relationships among lower level schemas (for ex-
ample in coordinating means–end behavior). There have been
a number of AI works explicitly modelling Piagetian senso-
rimotor schemas [31], [42]–[44]. These all have three-part
schemas of the form context/action/result. These models espe-
cially focus on allowing schemas to be learned autonomously
from experience, and also to facilitate the composition of
schemas (M5), and the construction of higher order schemas
from lower order ones [31]. These examples mostly work in
simplified simulations; it is likely that additional techniques
would be required if one wished to scale them up to the higher
dimensional state spaces of robotics scenarios (for example,
new sensory abstractions would be needed).
B. Planning Operators in Artificial Intelligence
Since the early days of AI, STRIPS-like planning operators
[45] have been used to do planning in closed and deterministic
worlds. Every action has clearly defined binary pre- and post-
conditions; everything is assumed to be observable and only the
agent’s actions can change the state space in which operations
take place. STRIPS-like planning operators (and later exten-
sions [46]) have been used successfully in restricted domains
but the major problem is the reliance on human programmers to
predefine all operators. Neither the actual action execution by
the robot (which can highly vary with the scene context) nor the
pre- and post- conditions are subject to any learning. As a con-
sequence, they require a completely designed world; the limits
of this approach have been accurately pinpointed by Brooks [7]
and Sutton [47]. There are, however, some more recent works in
AI planning that can learn planning operators [48], [49]. These
effectively learn pre- and post-conditions, but lack the mecha-
nism of motor differentiation (M3) to generate new actions.
C. Affordances
There is a close relationship between sensorimotor schemas
and the Gibsonian notion of affordances [50]. The visual per-
ception of a handle of a cup, for example, can be associated
with the action of grasping it and the effect of having a stable
grasp. AI implementations inspired by Gibsonian affordances
13The use of sensorimotor schemas in analysis does not necessarily mean that
we need to bring along all the Piagetian baggage, which many have criticized;
e.g., Fischer [4] says Piaget’s schema is too general, because according to Pi-
aget’s theory two skills using the same schema should happen at the same time,
and this cannot explain the phenomenon of horizontal décalage (for example,
that conservation of liquid is acquired long before conservation of mass). This
can be circumvented simply by making schemas less general. We may have
context specific schemas for each skill, which need not arise together (although
some processes such as Representational Redescription [14] may later recog-
nize the similarity).
arrive at knowledge structures very similar to the implementa-
tions of Piagetian schemas [32], [33], coding the effect of ex-
ecuting a particular behavior on an object. In other robotics
work, Modayil and Kuipers showed in [51] how the effects
of a physical robot’s actions on its perception can be learned.
Fitzpatrick and Metta [35] learned affordances for pushing ob-
jects and made initial steps towards learning categories (e.g.,
roll-able). Stoytchev [36] was able to learn tool affordances for
a set of tools by correlating the tool used, its movement, and the
effects on other objects in the scene. Affordances for grasping
have been learned through “play” and associated with object
models [52]. Hart and Grupen showed how intrinsic reward can
be given for the discovery of affordances [37]; in this work gen-
eralizable control programs can be learned and can evolve from
one task to the next. These generalizable control programs could
be understood as the action core of a sensorimotor schema.
D. Schemas in Neuroscience
Neuroscientific evidence from monkeys shows that object
shape is coded in a motor area of the brain, which is involved
mostly in the control of hand movements [53]; the authors of
this study concluded that “every time an object is presented,
its visual features are automatically (regardless of any inten-
tion to move) ‘translated’ into a potential motor action. This
potential action describes the pragmatic physical properties of
the objects.” This lends credibility to the idea of a sensorimotor
schema as a unit of knowledge, which links a particular percep-
tion with an appropriate action. This aspect of brain architecture
has also been modeled computationally [54].
E. Limitations of the Sensorimotor Schema
The sensorimotor schema always combines issues of percep-
tual, motor, and cognitive development, and in this, it is not al-
ways compatible with contemporary views. For example, in Pi-
aget’s view, perception tends to be built up by experience with
acting in various contexts. While this has clearly been shown to
be the case in an experiment with cat locomotion, for example
in [55], there is less evidence to support all the cases in which
Piaget held that the same process occurs. A classic example is in
the case of the means–end action of retrieving a hidden object.
Piaget held that it was through experiences with acting on ob-
jects in relationships such as “in front” that the perceptual and
representational competence to understand about hidden objects
was constructed. Contemporary views hold that many percep-
tual competences may be more independent from action com-
petence, and that in many cases perceptual competence might
come first [19, pp. 247 and pp. 260]. Nevertheless, even if per-
ceptual competence does lead, there may still be a place for ac-
tion to help with the interpretation of that perception [56, pp.
176]. It seems that the idea of sensorimotor schemas is not com-
pletely invalidated by later results, but the schema is not the
only unit of knowledge and may need to be complemented with
pure perceptual or motor competences, which may mature ac-
cording to some internal developmental processes [for example
the onset of stereoscopic depth perception [19, pp. 96], or the ar-
rival of stereotyped behaviors (see Section V-A)]; once they do
become available, it seems plausible that sensorimotor schemas
may again come into play to integrate them [57, pp. 148]. Fig. 1
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(lower track) shows some nodes that do not have precursors, and
these correspond to sensorimotor schemas that integrate newly
matured perceptual or motor competences.
It is not clear if the sensorimotor schema can also account for
high-level representations of objects, for example 3D models
that can be manipulated mentally. Knowledge of objects, which
is abstracted from any particular action, would seem to be a
prerequisite for more advanced types of planning. In particular,
the fact that older children and adults do have excellent gener-
alization abilities across domains indicates that representations,
which are relatively independent of particular tasks, must arise
during development. However, the developmental evidence
suggests this is a long and protracted process. This is illustrated
in the upper (abstract) track of Fig. 1.
F. Challenges in Formalizing Schemas
The major challenge in formalizing sensorimotor schemas
is probably to capture the dynamic properties of its actual ac-
quisition process. This acquisition requires us to 1) ground the
sensorimotor schemas in sensorimotor experience (meaning to
learn suitable pre- and post-conditions as well as associated suc-
cess likelihoods) by means of the mechanisms M1 and M2; 2)
define processes that lead to the creation of new sensorimotor
schemas by means of the mechanisms M3–M6; and 3) integrate
the sensorimotor schemas into the dynamically changing ab-
stract world knowledge by means of representational redescrip-
tion (M7). This final point means that at advanced stages of
infancy, schemas must be referring to relationships among ob-
jects in their contexts and results. The process of schema ac-
quisition requires the performance of a huge amount of mean-
ingful actions providing the required experience to feed the de-
velopmental process in a complex cognitive architecture. This
architecture is likely to be equipped with a not insignificant de-
gree of innate structure such as innate behaviors and a rudimen-
tary planning machinery (see Section IV-A) based on which the
still to be acquired schemas develop from initial sensorimotor
schemas. In this context, we recently introduced the concept of
so called “object-action complexes” (OACs) [58] as one pos-
sibility for formalizing the complex acquisition process associ-
ated with sensorimotor schemas. As for the process of represen-
tational redescription, perhaps the closest analog in robotics is
Bratko’s use of ILP [59] to find “insights,” leading to a “better
representation language which facilitates a more compact rep-
resentation of the current knowledge.”
In this paper, we give evidence that the development and en-
richment of sensorimotor schemas can be directly linked to the
development of tool use, and hence provides a means to tack-
ling the same problem in robotics. Insight into the development
of sensorimotor schemas in infants hence can also guide the de-
sign of artificial agents that learn to use tools.
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT
This section provides an overview of the different psy-
chological approaches to understanding infant development.
Section IV-A looks at maturation and learning during the
process of development. Section IV-B reviews Piaget’s theory,
which is probably the most well-known theory of cognitive
development. Section IV-C looks at Siegler’s overlapping
waves theory (from which we borrowed our three “stages” as
seen in Fig. 1). Section IV-D looks at the more recently popular
dynamic systems perspective on development. Finally, we look
at how a consistent picture of development could be found in
these theories.
A. Development: Maturation and Learning
Development includes both maturation and learning. Matu-
ration is a change, due to biological growth (or aging) in the
organism, without the need for environmental influences [56,
pp. 3], e.g., growth of certain centers in the brain. Learning is
a change due to information processing; for example, a change
in the organism’s competence resulting from the processing of
information from the environment. An extreme nativist view-
point would posit that all development is due to maturation,
with new brain structures unfolding according to a preset plan
hard-wired by the genome. An extreme empiricist viewpoint
would posit that all development is due to learning, with new
mental structures being constructed due to the processing of new
information from the environment (i.e., the software is changing
but not the hardware). Contemporary viewpoints lie between
the extremes. The evidence from the literature suggests a very
complex bidirectional interaction between physical changes (in
brain and body) and mental changes due to learning [60]. The
impact of changes in the body has been studied in the devel-
opment of locomotion [60], and body changes must also pose
problems for infants learning to use tools, but we know of no
studies addressing this. In this paper, we cannot address brain or
body changes in any detail since we are mainly concerned with
the description of the observable development of sensorimotor
schemas. The issue of interaction between innate structure and
learning is only indirectly observable (as with the interaction of
the concrete and abstract track indicated in Fig. 1). This problem
is also fundamental for roboticists since they need to determine
the prior structures of the systems they design.
There is quite a bit of research on the innateness of certain
kinds of knowledge in neurophysiology (see, e.g., [61] and [62])
and developmental psychology (see, e.g., [19]), which allows
for postulates on reasonable innate structures in robot systems
(see also [52]). In SectionV-A, we particularly point to a number
of innate behaviors that are used to bootstrap the developmental
process (see Section V-B); we also gave evidence for a certain
degree of innate machinery for planning in Section II-B.
B. Piagetian Schema Development
Piaget’s theory is called constructivism and is based on the
idea of the infant gradually building up knowledge structures
as he/she interacts with the environment. On the nature/nur-
ture spectrum, it is closer to nurture (i.e., the empiricist view-
point in Section IV-A). Piaget uses the sensorimotor schema
(see Section I) as the unit of knowledge. Piaget defined six se-
quential stages during sensorimotor development (from approx-
imately 0–2 years) [2], [20], with a qualitative difference be-
tween the sensorimotor schemas in use in each stage. Piaget’s
early stages roughly map to the three stages we outlined in
Section I.
Piaget’s Stages I-II roughly correspond to our Stage 1 (see
Section V-A), including reflexes such as sucking and grasping,
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as well as integrating different modalities (auditory, tactile, vi-
sual), and mastering reaching to grasp. Each behavior is associ-
ated with its own global schema, which generalizes from expe-
riences where the action happens, and recognizes the situations
where the action is triggered, and the expectation of what sen-
sory impressions arise while the action is in progress.
Piaget’s Stage III roughly corresponds to our Stage 2 (see
Section V-B) and involves repeating results fortuitously dis-
covered with objects in the environment, such as shaking a
rattle. During this stage there is a rapid growth in the number
of schemas in the infant’s repertoire, as new schemas are
differentiated (M3) from previous ones in order to repeat inter-
esting discoveries (e.g., squeezing, shaking, striking, scraping,
rubbing, and pulling).
Piaget’s Stages IV-V roughly correspond to our Stage 3 (see
Section V-C); means–end sequences of actions are performed.
For example, the infant will intentionally displace an obstacle in
order to retrieve a desirable object that is visible behind it. This
requires two distinct sensorimotor schemas–one for the means
action (displace the obstacle), and one for the end (grab the de-
sired object). This implies that the sensorimotor schemas must
now incorporate relatively advanced knowledge of the world;
they must capture the effect of an action on the relationships be-
tween objects (for example the relationship “in front”). Schemas
are also intentionally varied (Piaget’s Stage V) so that the rela-
tionships between initial conditions and effects can be studied.
Piaget’s Stage VI (roughly from 18–24 months) involves in-
ternal representation of objects, actions, and effects; this gives
rise to covert planning (though Willatts is sceptical and sees a
more continuous development in planning abilities [28]).
Through all this progression, there is a gradual increase in
the abstractness and objectiveness of the knowledge captured
by sensorimotor schemas; earlier schemas capture subjective
knowledge locked in particular contexts, while later schemas
abstract away from these contexts and capture knowledge about
relationships between objects and actions in the world.
Piaget’s stages do not have crisp boundaries between them,
and some behaviors are intermediate. The stages also have sig-
nificant overlap, so that a child who acquires his first Stage V
behaviors will also be spending a significant proportion of his
time engaging in behaviors belonging to earlier stages. How-
ever, the sequential ordering is strict, i.e., a child who exhibits
behavior from stage must have previously exhibited some be-
haviors from stage .
In Piaget’s theory, development happens either through the
modification of individual schemas or the relationships between
them. Within each of his six sensorimotor stages, schemas in-
dividually develop; by being executed in varied situations,
they refine the motor action of the schema and also refine their
knowledge of the various effects produced in various contexts.
Transitions between stages are explained through coordinations
among schemas. For example, means–end behavior emerges
in his fourth sensorimotor stage, and this development is ex-
plained as a process of coordination between the schemas of
previous stages. For example, the schema of hitting an obstacle
(means) could be coordinated with the schema of grabbing
an object (end) in order to remove an obstacle to prehension.
Computational modellers of Piagetian development (see [31]
and [42]–[44] ) have captured hallmarks of his theory; e.g., the
acquisition of higher order knowledge based on basic schemas
from a previous stage. However, these are only demonstrated
in “toy” domains; we believe it is necessary to work in more
realistic domains (i.e., closer to what an infant experiences) in
order to get close to modelling the mechanisms of development
that an infant needs to use. The history of AI shows that tech-
niques that work in toy domains do not necessarily shed any
light on the techniques needed for realistic worlds [7].14
In the last few decades, a great deal has been written about
where Piaget was right and wrong; Siegler gives a good brief
account in [63]. In summary, sometimes Piaget overestimated
infants’ abilities, and sometimes he underestimated them. How-
ever, possibly the biggest problem from a computational point
of view is simply the vagueness of his theory; it gives a rough
sketch of how the development happens, but leaves the mech-
anism of development very underspecified. Despite all the crit-
icisms, Piaget’s theory remains one of the few attempts to ex-
plain the whole of development, and quite probably is a reason-
able sketch of the outline of how the mechanism of development
works.
C. Overlapping Waves Theory
Siegler’s “overlapping waves” theory of development [64,
pp.7] holds that at a particular age a child will have a number
of different strategies for tackling a problem (for example, this
could be ways of approaching a particular tool use problem);
these different ways of thinking are all active at the same time
and may give rise to different conclusions, thus explaining how
a child may approach the same problem in different ways on
successive days. The different ways of thinking continue to
compete with each other over long time scales (e.g., several
months); with development, there are gradual changes whereby
more successful ways of thinking become used more frequently,
and others are used less frequently.
We are not aware of any computational work that emulates
these overlapping waves; computational approaches tend to
seek to learn the “correct” strategy and then to stick with it.15
In contrast, “overlapping waves” seems to be a “sloppy” way
of thinking; for example, if one strategy is clearly leading
to failure and another to success, it would seem logical to
abandon the first; however, children tend to continue using
“wrong” strategies (albeit less frequently) for some time. It
is possible that this approach leads to increased robustness,
because typical interactions in real-world situations have many
uncontrolled variables and do not give such clear cut results as
a science experiment would. In such situations, it may make
sense not to abandon any alternative for quite some time, so
that there are always alternative strategies to fall back on if the
one that first appeared promising eventually proves not to be
so. Furthermore, it has been shown that children who exhibit
14We do not see the need to work with real robots; simulationmay be adequate
provided the world is rich enough to allow typical infant tasks to be attempted.
Conversely, real robots may be inadequate if the tasks are oversimplified.
15One could consider reinforcement learning (RL) with options to be sim-
ilar, because an option may still be selected even if it has not been yielding
good rewards recently. However, Siegler’s “overlapping waves” are, generally
speaking, about higher levels of abstraction than those found in RL options.
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more varied ways of thinking learn more from training [65],
and more generally, variability in psychological development
may play the same critical role that it plays in evolutionary de-
velopment. In Fig. 1, the overlapping waves drawn on the lower
part apply equally well to the representational redescriptions in
the upper part of the diagram; i.e., older (more context specific)
representations will not be immediately retired when newer
(more generic) representations come online; the alternative
representations will continue to operate in parallel for some
time, with one or the other being used depending on the task.
Siegler broadly agrees with Piaget’s constructivist theory, but
he also highlights the importance of aspects that might be ne-
glected by an excessive focus on constructivism, for example,
the acquisition of associative knowledge (learned in specific
contexts) or more generally, the issue of knowledge retrieval
processes [65]. Siegler points out that it may not make sense to
ask “whether children ‘have’ a concept or strategy or theory at a
given age;” instead it may make more sense to investigate “the
set of conceptualizations and strategies and theories that chil-
dren know and the mechanisms by which they choose among
them” [65].
D. Dynamic Systems Approach
Piaget gives the impression of a rational infant that will take
sensible actions if he/she has the relevant knowledge. The dy-
namic systems view [60] attempts to explain behavior at a lower
level, via the activation and interaction of various low level pro-
cesses such as perceiving, moving, and remembering; the even-
tual behavior observed is explained in terms of these processes
and may not always appear rational from a more global perspec-
tive. This can lead to different conclusions being drawn from
behavioral studies. For example, according to Piaget’s view, if
an infant knows where a hidden object is, then the infant can
be expected to attempt to retrieve it from there; however, in the
dynamic systems perspective, an infant may reach toward the
wrong location because of an inability to suppress a response
performed earlier [38], or simply because some alternative ac-
tion has a higher activation (even though the infant might at the
same time have an expectation of perceiving the object in the
new location). The folk psychology concept of “knowledge”
is at too coarse a grain for dynamic systems explanations, so
that the question of whether or not an infant really “knows”
something (e.g., the location of an object) is not meaningful;
the behavior emerging from the infant’s lower level processes
may seem to demonstrate knowledge under some circumstances
and not others (i.e., context dependent). This relatively new
approach to understanding development helps to explain ear-
lier observations that often noted infants’ considerable difficulty
in inhibiting “obvious” actions, or actions in progress [15]. It
also could explain some of Siegler’s observations of the con-
text specificity of knowledge, and the switching between dif-
ferent strategies in different circumstances. Dynamic systems
have been employed in robotics for motor control [37], [66],
and some higher level aspects of cognition, e.g., for scene un-
derstanding [67]. However, these computational works, to date,
only capture a very small part of the scope envisaged by the
psychologists: e.g., it is envisaged that dynamic systems could
be employed to account for the development of a grounded un-
derstanding of human concepts; Thelen and Smith [60] outline
how a concept such as force could be developed by generalizing
from walking, reaching, crawling, and pushing.
E. Conclusion on Developmental Theories
The theories sketched above are not entirely consistent on all
details, but it is possible to find a consistent theory, which incor-
porates their major aspects, with some adjustments. From Pi-
aget’s theory, we can take the notion of sensorimotor schemas,
and amechanism of development, which builds new schemas by
operations such as differentiation or composition of old schemas
(see M1–M6). The overlapping waves theory can be accommo-
dated by ensuring that older behaviors will not be replaced at
once when newer more sophisticated behaviors develop; instead
both will continue in parallel and may be elicited in different
contexts. The dynamic systems approach impresses on us the
necessity to model at a fairly low level, so that sensorimotor
schemas may be quite context specific, and triggered in cer-
tain situations, without a global overview ensuring consistency
and rationality in behavior. This means that developments to
new “stages” do not happen all at once but include a protracted
phase of intermediate behaviors where behaviors in some do-
mains are more advanced than others. Abstract domain-general
knowledge and representations may be very slow to arise. The
brief review above also supports some of the mechanisms we
identified in Section I as underlying development. For example,
the mechanism of variation and selection (M2) is very evident
and is believed to be a primary mechanism in development both
at low levels such as learning motor synergies [68] and also at
higher levels in selecting which strategies to use [65].
V. THE BEHAVIORAL STUDIES (CONCRETE TRACK)
This section looks at behavioral developments in the first two
years of life, which we believe to be relevant to the development
of tool use. The developmental descriptions in this section (and
Section V-C specifically) are not intended to comprehensively
describe how particular examples of tool use develop, but in-
stead to be suggestive of the ways in which aspects of tool use
development unfold in infancy.We stress the importance of sen-
sorimotor learning as a precursor to tool use, and we explain
how the six mechanisms (distilled in Section I) are in operation
in the examples to follow. To give a complete developmental
trajectory for a particular tool use example would require exten-
sive longitudinal studies, which have not yet been carried out.
This section is organized roughly in order of developments,
which build on each other, including the supposed precursors
to tool use, and simple examples of tool use of increasing com-
plexity. These behaviors are summarized in Fig. 1 where there
are three overlapping waves for the three types of behavior:1)
behaviors without objects (see Section V-A); 2) behaviors with
single objects (see Section V-B); and 3) object-object behav-
iors (see Section V-C). These subsections cover the precursors
to tool use, and then Section V-D takes an in depth look at one
particular example of tool use, which is common in the second
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Fig. 2. Behaviors at various ages. The left side of each rectangle indicates the age at which the behavior appears; the right side is meaningless. Cross references
to the section of this paper that describes the behavior are given in parentheses. The arrows show an example of a chain of supposed precursor behaviors. Some of
the ages here come from Uzgiris and Hunt [69] with the warning that they should not be interpreted as typical for infants in general. They are provided to indicate
an order of progression, rather than precise timings.
year of infancy: self-feeding with a spoon. Fig. 2 graphs the in-
dividual behavioral developments covered in this section.
A. Behaviors Without Objects
Here, we analyze some typical behavior patterns of infants,
which do not require manual contact with objects or surfaces.
First, there are a number of “reflexes” such as reaching or
rooting for the breast. However, von Hofsten [70] cites ev-
idence showing that these and other examples of supposed
reflexes do not in fact share the expected properties of reflexes
(e.g., elicited and automatic) and, in fact, turn out to be under
voluntary control. He states that, as with other mammals, it
should not be surprising to find sophisticated prestructured
actions in human neonates. Second, there are “rhythmical
stereotypical behaviors,” which Thelen describes as being
more complex than reflexes, but less variable and flexible than
full voluntary behavior [18]. This lack of variability may be
an example of the strategy of initially reducing the degrees
of freedom of the motor control problem (see Section II-A).
Roboticists have also implemented a similar strategy to reduce
the variability in early actions, using rhythmic movements [71]
or “goal babbling” [72].
Thelen [73] observed infants longitudinally during the first
year, and recorded all rhythmical stereotypical behaviors; this
meant any movement that was repeated at least three times at
regular short intervals of about a second or less. Forty seven dis-
tinct behaviors were observed, appearing at different times. We
will describe eight of these, involving arms, hands, and fingers,
which seem most relevant as precursors to tool use (rather than
leg movements, or whole body movements, etc.). The numbers
in parentheses describe the percentage of sampled infants who
exhibited the behavior.
• Arm wave (100%)–a rapid flapping of the arm vertically
from the shoulder . This leads to surface slapping behavior
(see Section V-B6), and also waving of objects and banging
them on surfaces (see Section V-C1).
• Finger flex (100%)–lexion and extension of all four fingers
simultaneously, and often the thumb. This probably leads
to exploratory behaviors with objects (see Section V-B5).
• Hand rotate (90%) and flex (80%)–a rhythmic rotation,
bending, and extending of the wrist. This is subsequently
performed with objects; possibly it is used in object explo-
ration (see Section V-B5).
• Clap hands together (75%) (referred to by Thelen as pat-a-
cake)–this later leads to stereotyped banging objects to-
gether (see Section V-C8).
• Arm fly together (20%) and plucking (15%)–these were
similar to clapping, but the hands were not extended to
30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTONOMOUS MENTAL DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 5, NO. 1, MARCH 2013
slap palms together; hands were brought together and then
thrown apart; these may also be precursors to banging ob-
jects together (see Section V-C8).
• Finger rotate (15%)–similar to “the movement used in
turning a large dial, where the fingers are rotated slightly
outward” [73]; this may lead to rotation of lids/dials.
Other stereotypical behaviors relevant to tool use are only per-
formed with objects, and so are covered in Section V-C1.
The percentage of the infants’ time spent engaging in these
movements rose during the period from about 1 month through
to 6–7 months [18], after which it plateaued and then fell off to-
wards the end of the first year. The average time spent engaging
in the movements at the peak was approximately 9%. Although
the overall frequency of stereotyped behaviors declined in the
second half of the year, the number of different types of behav-
iors rose, because new behaviors were added without the loss
of older ones (unfortunately, the study did not report on which
specific behaviors appeared at which times). Behaviors tended
to be more variable around the time of their first appearance than
later [which may be the mechanism of variation followed by se-
lection, (M2)].
Since the behaviors described above have no obvious precur-
sors, and given that older children and adults do not perform
these behaviors, it is not possible that they were imitated, and it
is surmised that they are innate. Furthermore, Thelen states that
“the onset of particular stereotypes is largely dependent upon
events intrinsic to the infant” [73]. Thelen suggests that the be-
haviors are not much affected by the environment, but rather
“internally guided” [73]. Thelen suspects that the behaviors may
emerge as by-products of the normal maturation of motor con-
trol circuits, but that they may be opportunistically used by in-
fants for the purpose of bootstrapping further development, for
example, by encouraging actions, which will at some point lead
to interesting results. Evidence that spontaneous behavior such
as kicking can be transformed into an instrumental behavior
comes from Rovee and Rovee [74] (as early as 10 weeks) and
also Piaget’s work (his second sensorimotor stage, which is at
approximately 4 months). This follows the pattern of accidental
discovery followed by intentional exploitation (already seen in
Section II-B, for means–end behavior, and which we will see
arise in many later behaviors). Furthermore, Thelen [18] spec-
ulates that these stereotyped movements may be incorporated
in hierarchically structured advanced skills [composition (M5),
and means–end in Section II-B3)], where the stereotyped move-
ments form low-level subunits. Recent AI work shows how
this could fit in the framework of hierarchical reinforcement
learning [71].
Apart from stereotypical movements, calibration of the vi-
sion, motor, and proprioceptive systems seems to also take place
in the first months of life, which is related to various calibra-
tion tasks connected to vision-based robotics [75]–[77]. Infants
may regard their hands moving during the second month, but
the vision does not guide the hands [2, pp. 102]. Subsequent to
this, vision augments the activity of the hand. Infants engage in
extensive self-exploration by 2–3 months [78]. Young infants,
when viewing their ownmovements, are sensitive to visual-pro-
prioceptive contingency; infants that are 3 months are able to
discriminate between direct and delayed views of self-produced
leg movements. 16 Rochat [78] concluded that there is evidence
for a perceptual-based body schema at this time. It would be
interesting to know how this body schema can predict interac-
tion with seen objects. Bower [79, pp. 123] has shown that there
seems to be an innate knowledge17 of when a primitive reach
should contact a seen object because infants were distressed by
a “virtual object,” which they could see and reach for, but which
produced no tactile sensation. However, this expectation of con-
tact is likely to be very specific to reaching for a target; we are
not aware of any experiments, which determine when the infant
displays knowledge of expected collisions with objects that are
not the targets of reaching.
In summary, these behaviors without objects give some of the
initial sensorimotor schemas, which form the beginning of the
developmental story illustrated in Fig. 1; together with the basic
mechanisms M1–M6, they start the developmental process, and
become differentiated (M3) and composed (M5) to produce new
schemas. This happens because these initial behavioral patterns
cause interesting events to occur (touch, sound etc.), leading to
differentiation of schemas (M3); subsequent variation and selec-
tion (M2) helps to fine-tune these new schemas so that they be-
come increasingly predictable (and potentially intentional). Ad-
ditionally, some of these innate patterns seem to trigger multi-
sensory expectations indicating an innate multi-sensory expe-
rience space [80]. These behavioral patterns play an important
role in learning a body schema.
B. Behaviors With Single Objects
1) Learning to Reach and Grasp: Reaching is an obvious
precursor to dealing with objects, but it is probably particularly
relevant to simple tool use because similar problems seem to
be involved. For example, in learning to control a stick there is
a similarity between learning to bring the hand in contact with
a seen object, and learning to bring the stick (which could be
viewed as an extension of the hand, see, e.g., [81]) in contact
with an object. One needs to solve a degrees of freedom problem
to control joints, and a scaling problem to apply the correct force
to each element; furthermore there may be visual feedback (ser-
voing) to control the movement to the target. It is probable that
evolution has developed innate routines to bootstrap the devel-
opment of reaching, and it is plausible that some of that innate
machinery may be reused for tool use.
Neonates seem to have a very premature reach and grasp
mechanism, which reduces in frequency over the first two weeks
of life, and is hard to elicit in the period from 4–20 weeks
[79], [82, Ch. 6]. The neonate primitive reach motion is visu-
ally elicited, and ballistic, with no visual feedback to correct the
reach motion while it is in progress [56, pp. 38] and it has a rela-
tively low success rate (9–40% [19, pp. 250], [79]). Bruner [83]
suggests that this type of innate response is coded in by evolu-
tion to serve as a “launching stock” from which skilled actions
can then be constructed. The mechanism of variation and se-
lection (M2) seems to be important in building on such innate
patterns to develop mature reaching, as shown by Thelen et al.’s
16Leg movements are also included in Thelen’s stereotypical behaviors, but
we have omitted them here because they seem less relevant to tool use.
17His youngest experimental subject was 4 days old
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[84] detailed study. One striking result of their study was that
there were dramatic differences in how four different infants
first reached for toys, and how they developed; each seemed
to have their own developmental pathway.18 There is little evi-
dence that the capability to grasp accurately is present in the first
month of life, although some elements such as hand opening
are present [56]. The hand opening disappears at about two
to three months, and the behavior becomes more of a swiping
with a closed fist, which is then replaced by an open-handed
reaching, but with no grasp [85]. The reduction in reaching at
about 7 weeks does not appear to be due to any loss of interest
in nearby objects, because visual fixation increases; it is pos-
sible that the reduction in interest is because of the excitement
of looking inhibiting the motor response, but also there must
be some reorganization of the motor control to explain how the
hand opening becomes separated from reaching [86].
It is not until about the fourth month that proper visually
elicited grasping will commence and that the infant will bring
the hand into view to grasp seen objects even when the hand is
not initially in view [69, pp.110]. The more mature reach and
grasp, which appears at about five months has about an 80%
chance of contacting the target, with the possibility of visual
feedback to correct the reach in progress, although the grasp co-
ordination appears to have regressed [79]. It seems that the prim-
itive reach-grasp was undifferentiated (i.e., the reach and grasp
are coupled), and by 20 weeks two separate motions have re-
placed it (M4), which can now be executed independently or co-
ordinated. Gordon [87] also notes that this type of regression fol-
lowed by advancement is common: reorganizations can initially
result in a decline of the motor skills, before improvement. After
this period, the coordinated reach and grasp develops rapidly;
Bower reports 100% accuracy on visually elicited reaching [79,
pp. 174] at 6 months.
Studies with prisms, which distort the infant’s vision, show
that the infants can use the visual feedback to correct their
reaches [88]. However, the visual feedback does not seem to be
necessary for normal successful reaching; studies of reaching
for glowing objects in the dark [89] conclusively show that
sight of the infant’s limb is not necessary either at the onset
of successful reaching or in succeeding weeks; proprioceptive
information must therefore be employed. Nevertheless, vision
does seem to be important in normal infants’ development
of a common mapping system for auditory, proprioceptive,
and visual information, because reaching in blind infants is
substantially delayed [89].
A computational model of the development of reaching ap-
pears in [90] and is also shown to model recalibration in a condi-
tion analogous to prismatic adaptation studies with infants [91].
The robotics community has developedmultiple methods for in-
tegrating visual feedback into reaching movements and they are
called visual servoing (for an overview, see [92], [93]). A more
developmental inspired approach to learning to grasp is shown
in [94]. Before being able to apply this method to the object
that should be grasped, the object needs to be determined in the
18Such development pathways give useful material, which helps in the dis-
covery of the underlying mechanisms of development. Also, they illustrate a
degree of robustness and generality in these mechanisms, in that they can cope
with a variety of different configurations.
scene. One method that segments an area (the potential object)
in a biologically motivated fashion is [95]. The method is able
to do this segmentation procedure based on a starting point on
the object. This requires a visual attention mechanism to focus
on the possible interesting objects in the scene (see [96] for an
overview from a cognitive robotics perspective).
2) Refining the Reach and Grasp Movement Parameters:
Bruner [83] sees a commonality between the development of
reaching to grasp, and the development of other goal-directed
skilled actions. In each case the behavior starts out with a series
of component acts (for reaching these include raising of arms,
ballistic flinging, and closing the hand), but the sequence is not
correct and the acts are crude; once the sequence becomes cor-
rect each component is “drastically altered to fit task require-
ments.” With more practice the whole sequence becomes en-
ergy efficient, which suggests that there may be a feedback in
the system based on efficiency. Eventually, the whole sequence
becomes modularized (M6) so that it can appear as a component
in new higher order sequences.
There is a developmental progression in the infant’s use of
information about the size of objects for grasping; infants as
young as eight weeksmakemore reaches to a graspable ball than
to one that is too large [56, pp. 43]); 5-month-olds tend to reach
with two hands regardless of size, whereas 7- to 8-month-olds
use two hands for large objects more often than for small ones,
and at 11 to 12 months reaching closely reflects the object’s
diameter [97]. A similar pattern appears for the thumb–index
finger angle opening during the reach, which increases after 7
to 8 months, as well as the adjustment of the angle to the ob-
ject diameter, and the proportion of the object within the hand
opening at touch [97]. In studies of 5-, 9-, and 13-month-old
infants [56, pp. 44], it was found that all infants began hand clo-
sure before contact, but younger infants began closure later.
For orientation, it was found that 9-month-olds rotated their
hand to adjust to the orientation of a stick before grasping,
whereas 5-month-olds did most of the adjustment after contact.
A detailed longitudinal study [85] has shown a qualitative
change in grasp preorientation occurring between 5 and 7
months, which is roughly in line with other results [98]. Inves-
tigations of the importance of vision to preorientation [99] have
shown that 7-month-olds could preorient correctly to grasp a
glowing rod in the dark, showing that visual monitoring of
the hand’s orientation was not necessary. For 9-month-olds, it
was shown that they could orient correctly and grasp the rod if
shown the rod only before reaching, but the rod remained dark-
ened during reach onset and grasp. Again (as in the previous
section), proprioception must be used here, and the authors
suggest that vision is used to calibrate the proprioceptive infor-
mation from the limbs, and thereafter vision is not necessary.
These results on size and orientation show that fragments of
a practical object representation are present at this early stage
(see also Section VI); by “practical” we mean that it may be
encoded via the motor action that can grasp it. Such represen-
tations allow for the distinction of object size and orientation,
while the strategies to adapt grasping appropriately evolve over
time. We surmise that these early fragments of representation
form the basis for later more complete and action-independent
representations (see Fig. 1, upper track).
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Fig. 3. Developing grasps. (a) Voluntary palmar grasp. (b) Radial palmar grasp.
(c) Scissors grasp. (d) Inferior pincer grasp. (e) Pincer grasp.
3) Development of Grasping Competences: Infant grasping
abilities develop throughout the first year of life. There is an ini-
tial reflex, called the “neonatal palmar grasp,” which is present
from birth, and where the fingers close on stimulation of the
palm; there are conflicting results [100] about whether this dis-
appears gradually over the first year, or disappears after two
months, or gradually merges into voluntary grasping.
With regard to voluntary grasping, Touwen [100], in his lon-
gitudinal observations of 27 male infants, noted a development
through five different phases of grasping. The voluntary palmar
grasp [see Fig. 3(a)] uses the whole hand (appearing on av-
erage at about 4 1/2 months). The radial palmar grasp [see
Fig. 3(b)] is performedmainly with the area of the palm between
the thumb and the second and third finger, i.e., with the thumb
opposed (appears on average at about 7 months). The scissors
grasp uses the volar sides (the volar is the lower surface of the
hand, i.e., which includes the palm) of the extended thumb and
index finger (appears on average at about 8 1/2 months), or al-
ternatively the side of the curled index finger [101], as shown
in Fig. 3(c). There follow some intermediate stages before the
proper pincer grasp that include the scissor-pincer grasp, which
uses the tip of the index finger and the volar side of the extended
thumb (appears on average at about 11 months), an alternative
inferior pincer, which uses the tip of the thumb and volar sur-
face of index finger [101] [see Fig. 3(d)] and the pincer grasp
[see (Fig. 3(e)], which uses the volar surfaces of the tips of the
thumb and index finger almost exclusively (appears on average
at about 12 months). Development is by no means finished here;
the second year will see an improvement in the use of appro-
priate forces, and the grasp will not approximate adult perfor-
mance until 6 to 8 years, with further subtle improvements in
adjustments of force and anticipatory control continuing until
adolescence [87]. This gives potentially valuable indications for
roboticists on how the control of artificial dexterous hands can
be learned in some hierarchical scheme starting from a coarse to
a fine grained representation. We are not aware of any works in
robotics that have already addressed this problem directly. In-
stead, works that transfer grasps known for a specific object to
new situations reactively (e.g., [102]) or that transfer grasps be-
tween similar objects (from the same category) [103] have been
shown.
4) Developing the Stereotypical Behaviors With Objects:
Once reaching and grasping are mastered (at about 5 months),
the stereotypical movements discussed in Section V-A (without
objects) can easily be performed when an object is grabbed, and
this is exactly what happens [due to the mechanism of repetition
(M1)]. Thus, arm waving becomes waving with an object held
in the hand, such as a rattle. The opening and closing of the
fingers can be done with an object, either to catch (and release)
it or scratch it. These behaviors lead to new interesting effects,
and so are reinforced (corresponding to Piaget’s third stage
which occurs from about 4 to 8 months). This is quite a clear
example of the process of differentiation of schemas (M3),
which can be followed by variation and selection (M2) to refine
the newly differentiated schema. Other behaviors appearing
include rubbing an object with the hand, or squeezing an object,
or crushing (e.g., paper). The use of stereotypical behaviors on
objects, to learn the effects, matches closely robotics work on
affordances [33]; however, we are not aware of robotics work,
which also does differentiation (M3) to adjust the motor action
to better achieve new effects, and eventually to branch out to
a series of new behaviors, as depicted in moving from left to
right in Fig. 1 (concrete track).
Some developments with a superficially similar appearance
to tool use can also appear at this time, for example, an infant
can pull strings to shake something tied to the end, or if the infant
is in possession of a stick, and it accidentally hits an object,
then this action can be repeated. This “accidental to intentional”
pattern is a feature of the repetition mechanism M1. However,
the combination is discovered by accident and the relationship
between the objects is not understood; this is shown by the fact
that strings that are close, but not connected to the object, will
also be pulled [2], and in the stick example, there is no ability
to control the direction in which the stick is pointing.
Infants may also rotate an object during random exploration
at 6 months [2], although it is doubtful that it is done with the
intention of seeing the other side, as they are incapable of fully
turning objects to find a hidden desired side until about 9 months
[69, pp. 120]. They may, however, intentionally half-rotate an
object to bring a seen desired part to the mouth [2].
5) Multi-Sensory Object Exploration: There is an obvious
progression in the sophistication of the infant’s object manip-
ulation abilities, but in parallel with this there is the less ob-
vious development in the infant’s perceptual abilities. It is sur-
mised that, in some instances, the behavioral developments help
the perceptual development [104], [105]; this has been studied
in the case of haptic perception. Before reaching to grasp is
mastered, objects are manipulated, and information about them
is gathered haptically. Infants haptically perceive object size
probably during the first months of life [104]. Newborns have
been shown to discriminate objects by haptic exploration (e.g.,
cylinder versus prism) based on shape [80]. More specifically,
2-month-olds can gather partial knowledge of shape from clues
such as points, curves, or the presence or absence of a hole [80].
We saw in relation to grasping (see Section V-B3) that a visu-
ally based object representation was forming, now we see here
that a haptic based representation is forming in parallel. Strate-
gies and representations for haptic exploration in robotic sys-
tems have been developed (e.g., [106], [107]). Most of these
approaches still suffer from the poor quality of available tactile
sensors (compared to the tactile sensors of humans).
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There is also evidence of cross-sensorial transfer in neonates
[80]; i.e., infants whowere habituated by haptically exploring an
object were subsequently able to visually discriminate between
that object and another novel object. This transfer from touch
to vision has also been shown to be present at 2 months, but
transfer in the other direction is absent (i.e., infants do not hap-
tically discriminate between two objects if they have just seen
one of them) [80]. Interestingly, at 5 months (when reaching
and grasping are coordinated) the reverse has been shown: in-
fants transfer from vision to touch, but no longer from touch to
vision [80]. It has been surmised that the two senses may have
their own representations developing at different rates, and at
certain times the level of representation in each one might not
facilitate transfer; the haptic system seems to be present very
early and to mature slowly, whereas the visual system appears
later but develops more rapidly [80].
Infants can perceive hardness or compliance by 6 months and
possibly earlier; the development of such perception may be fa-
cilitated by the main action performed with objects for about the
first three months, which is to grasp in a fist and open and close
in a kneading pattern. Infants can perceive tactile texture19 by 6
months, but not earlier [104], [108]; this may be because it re-
lies on practice with exploratory rubbing movements. In normal
contexts infants perceive weight at probably about 9 months,
which notably comes after they have experience with waving
objects, although there are exceptions [108]. In darkness, when
infants are seated upright on the parent’s lap, 3-month-olds can
perceive weight; the darkness removes visual stimuli that may
be consuming the infants’ attention, and the infants’ posture
means that as soon as they have possession of the objects they
have to support their weight (as opposed to fingering them on a
table) [109]. There is also some evidence that properties of tem-
perature, texture, and compliancemay be perceived by 3months
if in the dark [109]. These advanced results in darkness highlight
the difficulty of determining the competences of infants; failure
to perform a task might not reflect a lack of ability, but rather
it may be simply because a competing stimulus was more ex-
citing.
The above examples show how behavior may facilitate a per-
ception. In the other direction, infants’ behaviors with objects
are affected by their haptic perception. Lockman presented in-
fants at ages 6, 8, and 10 months with hard and soft objects
[110]. Infants at all ages squeezed the soft object significantly
more than the hard object, but squeezing of the soft object in-
creased significantly with age.
To model similar behaviors in artificial systems, sensors com-
parable to the human system are required.While powerful visual
sensors are readily available nowadays the selection of available
complex tactile sensors is very limited. These sensors show a
significantly worse performance compared to human abilities in
some or all of the following dimensions: spatial resolution, sen-
sitivity, disparity between capabilities of hands and capabilities
of sensors, long term stability, and system integration [111]. In
this sense, further progress on tactile sensor development needs
19Texture here means the fine-grained property distinguishing same-shaped
blocks if they were covered with, e.g., a towel, rubber, smooth cloth, or plain
wood. Two objects appearing the same to the eye may have different textures,
so the term is not synonymous with its use in computer vision.
to me made before similar behaviors can be replicated in artifi-
cial systems.
6) Hand-to-Surface Interactions: Hand-to-surface interac-
tions tend to occur after manipulation of objects because the
infant usually needs to be seated (with some assistance at about
6 months [104]) in order to access surfaces. Interactions be-
tween the hand and a surface can be considered to be quite sim-
ilar to the hand with an object, and again the rhythmic flexion
and extension of fingers (described above [73]) was also often
performed to scratch a surface. Lockman specifically studied
surface interactions; he presented infants at ages 6, 8, and 10
months with surfaces that were liquid, discontinuous (net), flex-
ible (sponge), or rigid [110]. He recorded actions of slapping,
picking, rubbing, and pressing; these actions may themselves
be derived from stereotypical behaviors (e.g., slapping from
waving) or recently acquired grasping actions (e.g., picking).
He found that infants discriminate. For example, they pressed
a flexible surface more than the other three and rubbing was
more prevalent across liquid; furthermore, the discrimination
develops with age, becoming more pronounced. Overall, we see
that once infants are grasping and acting on objects (or surfaces),
they begin to discriminate the properties of those objects, and
this must link to developing object representations, which are
beginning to be formed. By now the infant understands some-
thing of the properties of individual objects (as a result of differ-
entiation, M3). This means that the sensorimotor schemas (e.g.,
for banging and pressing) include sensory abstractions, which
discriminate between different objects and surfaces (in order
to predict different consequences for the action being executed
on each one). This discriminating knowledge forms a substrate,
which will allow the infant to progress to learning about the ef-
fects of actions involving relationships among these objects and
surfaces. Recent robotics work has shown that a robot equipped
with different sensors (vibrotactile sensors [112], accelerome-
ters [113] or strain gauges and Polyvinylidene Fluoride sensors
[114]), and performing exploratorymovements, can learn to dis-
criminate different surfaces; this should likewise be useful for
building multi-sensorial object representations.
C. Object–Object Behaviors
This section covers the early object–object interactions that
involve controlling relationships among objects. Through these
interactions, knowledge about the relationships between objects
is acquired.
1) Object-to-Surface Interactions: Two of Thelen’s stereo-
typical movements [73] were performed only as an object–
surface interaction. One movement consisted of an infant
holding an object and rubbing it (horizontally) against the
surface of a table or floor, with movement from the shoulder.
The second was a push–pull movement from the elbow (flex
and extend) with the arm parallel to the floor or table. This was
typically done for an object too heavy to be lifted, so instead it
was pushed back and over on the surface; it arises due to the
interaction between an innate motor behavior (push–pull of the
elbow) and the constraints of the physical world. A plausible
explanation is that differentiation (M3) adjusts the innate motor
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action, producing a new version, which can subsequently be
used even to push light objects across a surface.
The stereotypical waving action has been performed with
objects, as noted in Section V-B6; now when a hard surface
is present, this can lead to the behavior of banging on the
surface to produce an interesting sound. Lockman studied how
this banging action becomes discriminatory (a result of sensor
differentiation, M3). This means that infants begin to learn
what object-surface combinations will produce the sound (i.e.,
learning contexts and effects of the new schema), and per-
form motor differentiation (M3) to increase the sound. Again,
Lockman presented infants at ages 6, 8, and 10 months with
surfaces that were liquid, discontinuous (net), flexible (sponge),
or rigid, and also with hard and soft blocks [110]. In this case,
there was an inability of the younger infants to discriminate
some of the relationships. All infants banged differentially,
banging more frequently with the hard block on the net and
rigid surfaces, but only the 10-month-olds banged the hard
block more than the soft one. Also, only the 10-month-olds
differentially rubbed across surfaces, rubbing over the rigid
one for longer. This again suggests that infants develop by first
focusing on the exploration of individual objects and only at
a later stage focusing on object relations. As a consequence,
by 10 months, there is a general improvement in the ability to
handle relationships between a grasped object and a surface it
acts on. Possibly the limitation of younger infants is important
because it prolongs the period of dealing with simple relation-
ships, so that they can be learned thoroughly.
A further study [115, Ch. 21] tested infants, from 8 to 10
months, on a monthly basis, with hammers for banging surfaces.
The hammer heads were hard, soft, or half hard/half soft. The
surfaces were hard or soft. Infants at this age were able to hold
a hammer by its handle, to use as a tool. It was found that all
ages banged the hard hammer more than the soft hammer, and
on the hard not soft surface. Furthermore, there were more hits
with the hard side of the mixed hammer.
This action then is almost tool use, however, orienting a
hammer to a surface is easier than directing it at a specific ob-
ject. When an infant is presented with two surfaces on a table,
side by side, and is able to selectively bang on one surface, then
the infant shows awareness that these two surfaces are distinct.
This is very close to selectively banging against another object,
and forms a possible bridge to banging a held object against a
stationary one.
Overall, the path we have traced shows how the original
stereotypical movements could help to bootstrap the devel-
opment of object-object actions primarily via the mechanism
of differentiation (M3), which is itself triggered by accidental
discovery following repetition (M1).
2) Taking an Additional Object: As soon as infants can
grasp one object, they will inevitably face situations where they
want to grab another even though they are already holding one.
Bruner [15] examined the way infants respond to being handed
multiple toys, one after the other. Infants from five different
age groups were tested.
At 4–5 months, some infants could not even get the first toy,
and some could not hold it for long. Some infants succeeded
in taking the second toy, but only because they inadvertently
dropped the first before taking the second. In general, infants
tended not to grab the second toy if the first toy was already in
the process of being taken to the mouth.
At 6–8 months, good command of the grasp was attained.
On being presented with the second toy infants at this age often
transferred the first toy to the other hand, to free the preferred
hand for reaching. The development of this behavior came from
taking the first object to the midline in order to hold it with the
two hands, and then reaching out with the nearest hand; and this
then evolved into an anticipatory handover. This is a composi-
tion (M5) of “handing over” and “reaching for the next object.”
Sometimes, instead of the transfer, the infant would reach across
with the empty hand.
At 9–11 months, one fifth of the trials successfully dealt with
three to four objects. The strategy employed was to put one in
reserve storage (in the lap or beside the infant) to free the hand
for the second, although this often (50% of the time) triggers
another grasp attempt immediately, i.e., the infant forgets why
he put down the first object and/or cannot inhibit the action of
retrieving it again immediately (see again Section II-B on affor-
dance-based to goal-based action). Overcoming this difficulty
requires a capacity to delay the retrieval response and to main-
tain the intention for grasping the new object. These abilities are
obviously also important for more complex problem solving re-
quiring planning (see Section II-B).
At 12–14 months, the storage strategy was well-developed,
and furthermore, the infants can place an object in storage be-
fore a third or fourth object is handed to them. It is not clear how
the storage strategy develops from the handover strategy. At
15–17 months, the mean number of objects the infant can take
possession of has gone from 3.0 to 3.7, and objects are stored
in one way consistently. Overall, from 6–17 months, there is a
gradual increase in leaving it there, rather than a sudden step
change. The development shows a process of integration of the
constituent acts (pull to self, place in storage, reach for new ob-
ject) into a successful behavior (see modularization, M6) [15].
We can also see that knowledge of space and special locations
is necessary for dealing with more than one object. In the ear-
lier interactions with a single object the reach and grasp were
triggered, and then the infant manipulated the object. Location
was implicitly coded in the reach behavior, but the infant was
not forced to be aware of this. However, when two objects are
being handled, the infant is forced to become aware of locations
apart from the location implicit in a reach. We have mentioned
the beginnings of object representation before; we see here the
beginnings of spatial representation, which becomes more ab-
stract in a similar way (see Fig. 1, abstract track).
3) Pulling the Supporting Object: Willatts analyzed the task
of pulling a towel to retrieve a supported toy at from 6 to 8
months [116]. He recorded not only success or failure on the
task, but also monitored the infant’s gaze, in order to have an
objective measure that could discriminate between accidental
success or intentional success. Younger infants (about 6months)
tend to give up on the toy and play with the towel instead, but in
doing so they often accidentally bring the toy into reach.Willatts
was able to monitor the infant’s gaze and to show that there was
a transition. Whereas the younger infants (6 months) gave up on
looking at the toy, as they got older, there were more glances to-
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wards the toy (8 months), suggesting that pulls of the towel were
intentional in order to retrieve the toy. These kinds of accidental
discoveries lead the child to understand the effects of various
actions on object-object relationships, and lead to the develop-
ment of a repertoire of “means” actions that can be employed
to achieve goals [2], [20]. This is an example of the mech-
anism of repetition (M1) leading to accidental discovery fol-
lowed by composition (M5) of the means–end behavior, which
then allows intentional exploitation and differentiation (M3) of
the motor action to more effectively pull the towel along the
table.
Note that in the case of support, the necessary relationship (on
top of) is not understood at 8 months, and up until 10 months or
later the infant will still pull a support even if the desired object
is held above it and not touching it [69, pp.111], or resting on an
object close to the support [2, pp. 283]. The acquisition of this
knowledge requires sensor differentiation (M3) in the context
of the pull-support schema.
4) The String: A string is tied to an object and must be
pulled in order to bring the object within reach. The string be-
havior is particularly easy because of its unbreakable contact
with the object [117]; it is hard to go wrong (in contrast to the
stick, Section V-C9), if the string is shaken wildly the object
will still not be lost from the end of it, and is quite likely to be
brought closer. The behavior is learned by differentiation (M3)
following accidental success (i.e., as in the support, initially
pulling the string without being aware that it will bring the ob-
ject closer). One difference from the support is that if the string
is not straight, it may require several iterations of reaching,
pulling, releasing, and reaching. It also involves composition
(M5) because the full behavior composes pulling the string with
reaching for and taking possession of the object. Two entities
are comprehended in a spatial relationship by this composition
(object and string). Uzgiris and Hunt [69] tested two different
string situations. The easier situation was on a horizontal sur-
face; themore difficult string behavior was when the object must
be raised vertically. The horizontal strategy fails because the
object falls if the string is released; success requires bimanual
control, typically with one hand pulling, and then passing con-
trol to the second hand, which prevents the object from falling,
while the first hand stretches again. Uzgiris and Hunt observed
the horizontal string task at 12 months, and the vertical string
task at 13 months [69, pp. 111].
5) Obstacle Removal/Avoidance: This behavior is a step to-
wards tool use because the relationship between two objects
must be acknowledged (obstacle and desired object), and one
must either remove the obstacle or detour around it. Learning
the means–end coordination to remove an obstacle in the way
of grasping is one of the first means–end behaviors described by
Piaget [2, pp. 217], which he places at 7 1/2 months; as with the
support, it may be learned by an accidental discovery followed
by intentional exploitation. This can be learned by decomposi-
tion (M4) of the waving motion (see Section V-C1) such that
only part is performed, thus taking the object out of the way.
Again, it also involves composition (M5), and two objects are
thereby comprehended in a spatial relationship. This is a diffi-
cult problem for infants at this age because they are not used to
dealing with two objects, and so it is hard for them to execute an
action on an object (obstacle) that is not the current goal; Piaget
speculates that other two-object behaviors such as placing one
object aside in order to take another (see Section V-C2) may de-
rive from obstacle removal [2, pp. 217].
Bruner [15] looked at the task of retrieving a toy from behind
a transparent lid. The lid could be easily lifted, but fell down
if not held open. The behaviors observed in infants were very
much in line with Siegler’s multiple strategies in overlapping
waves (see Section IV-C); infants used various strategies each of
which peaked at certain ages and decreased only gradually. The
youngest (6- to 8-month-olds) went directly for the toy and then
engaged in banging of the (closed) lid, which may have become
an end in itself; this behavior gradually decreased with age, but
still appeared in some trials for the oldest infants. Infants of
9 to 11 months predominantly used two different strategies:1)
raising and closing the lid, which also seemed to become an end
in itself (an example of play taking over, Section II-B); and 2)
raising the lid with one hand and carefully “worming” the same
hand into the opening so that the hand (and arm) prevent the lid
from closing. This is a differentiation (M3) of the reach schema,
to keep the lid open, and during the execution both lid and object
must be monitored. The fourth strategy was two-handed: the lid
is openedwith one or two hands, followed by a reach with one or
two hands, but the lid is not held open long enough for efficient
retrieval. This behavior had some presence in all groups, grad-
ually increasing and peaking for the oldest (15 to 17 months).
The final strategy involved holding the box open with one hand
while the other hand retrieved the toy; this increased sharply
after 12 months. Thereafter, there was no new strategy, but this
strategy became less effortful and quicker. Progress to the final
strategies is likely not a result of accidentally happening to use
two hands, and having success; rather, it probably depends on
general advances in bimanual control (see Section V-C7), and
so this is an example of where progress to a node (i.e., behavior)
in Fig. 1 (concrete track) may have to wait for all its necessary
precursors to be ready.
6) Rotate a Lever: This task involves a 42-inch lever that can
rotate about its center on a table. One side of the bar is within
reach of the child, but the far side is inaccessible. An attractive
toy is tied to the far side. The child must rotate the bar in order
to bring the toy around to the reachable area. This is difficult
because the child must take the unusual action of pushing the
bar away in order to bring the toy closer.
Koslowski and Bruner [118] tested children of three age
groups (12–14, 14–16, and 16–24 months) and categorized
the strategies they used. Strategy 1 was categorized as Linear:
reaching directly for the toy, trying to push the bar in a straight
line towards or away, pulling the table. Strategy 2 was referred
to as Oscillation: pushing the bar back and forth, but never
rotating more than 45 from the midline, and tending to return
it to midline after rotation. Here rotation is differentiated (M3)
from pulling by variation and selection (M2); this (motor)
differentiation is an example of “shaping” by the environment
(modifying the dynamics of the situation [119]); the child is
presented with what looks like a free stick, and the child pulls
it as though it were, but because its motion is constrained by
the fulcrum it only moves in one way, and the child gradually
discovers this motion. Strategy 3 is Partial Rotation: rotating
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45 and then stopping to consider the new position, but not
making a concerted effort to reach for the toy. Considering the
states is likely an example of sensor differentiation (M3) for the
new rotation schema. In strategy 4, the children are Absorbed
in the rotation activity, often rotating the toy within reach,
but ignoring the toy [see comments on affordance-based play
in Section II-B, which is the mechanism of repetition (M1)].
Strategy 5 was referred to as Rotate and Capture.
There was a progression towards more advanced strategies
with age. Younger children found it difficult to suppress the
linear strategy, and this explains the oscillation strategy. After
rotating a bit, they resort to pulling the bar straight towards them
(hence returning it to midline). Repeated failure with this almost
forces the child to consider unidirectional rotation. Thereafter
the child can pay attention to two aspects of the apparatus: ei-
ther the relation between movement of the bar and the position
of the goal, or the way in which the movement of the bar can be
effected. The authors suspect that both cannot be attended to si-
multaneously due to information processing capacity limits (see
Section II-C); therefore they must be first modularized (M6).
While focusing on looking at the toy, little progress is made in
unidirectional rotation, on the other hand focusing on the rota-
tion leads to strategy 4. Eventually the fact that the goal is within
reach is noted; this sort of accidental discovery bears some sim-
ilarity to the discovery of the support (see Section V-C3). The
change in strategies used was inline with Siegler’s overlapping
waves theory (see Section IV-C); there was a marked increase in
the use of strategy 3 by the 14- to 16-month-olds, and the 16- to
24-month-olds had the largest number of children using strate-
gies 4 and 5, but older strategies had not died away completely.
This is also inline with the idea of schemas being the unit of be-
havior: the novice child has a well-developed schema for pulling
in a straight line, but is only developing the schema for rotation;
the child must ignore the goal in order to focus on developing
the rotation schema further, so that it can be later used as ameans
action (see Section II-B). The child’s modular approach to the
problem has a major benefit. “Not only is the problem solved,
but it is solved for a wide variety of circumstances and forms
in which it is likely to be encountered, wherever the lever may
point, whatever its shape, and so forth. Transfer, so to speak, is
built into the solution” [118].
7) Advancing Bimanual Control and Object Manipulation:
Bimanual control is required in many tool use scenarios, and it
is reckoned to be an important component in explaining why
human tool use capabilities exceed those of other animals [115,
Ch. 24]. Behaviors such as holding an object in one hand,
and striking or stroking it with the other are the beginnings of
“role differentiated bimanual activity,” and appear as early as 7
months [120]. Some toys are more likely to elicit bimanual ac-
tivities than others at particular ages, but overall the frequency
of bimanual activities increases linearly with age [120]. Infants
of 7 months were as likely to execute bimanual activities on
toys with no movable parts, as those with moving parts, but
from 9 months onwards, toys with no movable parts elicited
few responses, and infants seemed more interested in toys with
parts to be independently manipulated [120]. It is surmised
that these developments require a combination of neural devel-
opments (i.e., maturation), as well as having the appropriate
objects, and also understanding the properties of those objects
(which can arise through sensor differentiation (M3) [120].
More sophisticated bimanual actions appear towards the end
of the first year. For example “contour-following” can be
observed at 12 months, which involves holding the toy in one
hand and maneuvering it, while the fingertips of the other
hand are moved smoothly over its edges [121], or employing a
single finger or pincer action for manipulation with the second
hand at 11 or 13 months [120]. Bimanual control has been
implemented in the iCub using the Passive Motion Paradigm,
to perform two-handed grasping and moving of objects [122];
role differentiated bimanual activity has been shown recently
for opening of a screw-top jar [123].
8) Relational Play: Apart from intentional problem solving,
there is also a natural progression towards object-object inter-
actions in infants’ free play. An overview of infant free play is
shown in Fig. 2 (just below the grasping track). When infants of
various ages were presented with a wide variety of toys, three
categories of play were observed [124]: 1) stereotypical play
was dealing with a single object (mouthing, fingering, waving,
banging) and dominated at 9 1/2 months; 2) relational play dealt
with associations of two or more objects and dominated at 13
1/2 months; and 3) functional play was using a toy in a manner
deemed appropriate to an adult, such as using a comb to comb
a doll’s hair; it dominated at 15 1/2 months. This study shows
that by 13 1/2 months most infants prefer to explore relation-
ships among objects, rather than exploring objects individually.
A further study [125] gave more insight into the precursors to
full relational play; at 7months, the very simple relational action
of banging two objects together was common, and by 9 months
infants could do very simple relational acts such as touching a
spoon to the base of a pot; it was between 9 and 13 months that
most infants made the transition from these simple relational
acts to “accommodative” relational acts such as putting a lid
on a pot or a spoon in a cup. At around 10–11 months, infants
begin to establish the links between particular objects and their
“canonical actions,” e.g., a hammer is for banging, a brush is
for sweeping, and also the spatial relationships that must be es-
tablished between tool and target object; e.g., the relations “in”
(key or screwdriver in a slot), on (one block on another), and
under (put a spatula under a pancake) [108].
These developments are what somemight call “stage change”
because there is a qualitative difference in the behavior. We are
not aware of any computational model that can capture this. It
seems to require advancement in the infant’s knowledge of ob-
ject relationships and spatial relationships. For example, begin-
ning with a very practical knowledge of a relationship between
two concrete objects, discovered during play, the infant gener-
alizes to other similar objects, and thus it becomes a more ab-
stract knowledge (increasing abstraction is shown by moving to
the right on Fig. 1, abstract track), which may involve processes
of representational redescription (M7).
9) The Stick: The behavior of the stick entails using a stick
to move an out-of-reach object and bring it within reach of the
hand. There is in fact a spectrum of behaviors under the broad
umbrella of “the stick.” The simpler end of the spectrum con-
sists of using a short stick to retrieve a barely-out-of-reach ob-
ject with a single sweep of the arm; the arm is initially extended
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so the stick reaches beyond the object, and then it is brought
towards the body (which may happen towards the end of the
first year). The more complex end of the spectrum includes be-
haviors using a long object (e.g., a long stick or mop) to knock
an object from side to side until it can be reached (which may
be placed at about 3 years [126]). Uzgiris and Hunt tested a
medium-length stick (18 inches long) [69, pp. 150]. They place
the behavior at 15–18 months [69, pp. 111]. It is a relatively
difficult behavior when compared to strings and supports be-
cause the tool is not given in the appropriate relationship from
the outset; the infant must create the appropriate relationship.
This is a complex example of differentiation (M3) and composi-
tion (M5). Its relatively late appearance suggests that it requires
certain precursors to be present, for example, an understanding
of spatial relationships to understand the necessity of getting be-
hind the object without knocking it further away.
Brown [126] tested children ranging from 17 to 36months old
for transfer ability in retrieval tasks with a variety of stick-like
tools, some of which had a hook or rake at the head. Tools varied
in length, rigidity, color pattern, and type of head. The chil-
dren never selected nonrigid tools. Overall, the children seemed
to understand quite well the properties required of an effective
tool for the task. Brown makes a strong case for the ability to
transfer being very much domain specific, and related to the
child’s understanding of causality in the particular task. The
stick behavior has been tackled in robotics by considering the
tool as an extension of the robot’s body schema (see survey
[127]). Observing video of infants (e.g., at 11 months) strug-
gling to use a stick suggests that they do not solve the problem
in this way; in particular, it is notable how they struggle to con-
trol the stick, and so cannot move its end as they move their
hand. The body-schema approach does not capture the under-
standing of causality that infants seem to achieve, i.e., the un-
derstanding that an independent object (stick) can effect motion
in another; the body-schema approach would not extend to un-
derstanding (and correctly predicting) how an externally con-
trolled stick would cause an object to move.
10) Perceptual Aspects in Retrieval Tasks: Bates et al. [117]
looked at perceptual aspects in retrieval tasks for 10-month-olds
using support, string, stick, and also a hoop and crook (stick with
semicircular hooked end). It was found that if the tool and de-
sired object both had the same color and texture, then it was par-
ticularly difficult for the infant to succeed. It was surmised that
the perceptual difference may help the infant to discriminate the
two objects and to keep them both in mind as separate entities.
A difference in both color and texture was no more helpful than
a difference in one or the other.
The effect of the spatial configuration of the objects as pre-
sented to the infant was also investigated. Four types of spatial
configuration were presented: 1) unbreakable contact (support
and string); 2) breakable contact (hoop or crook, presented in
contact so that the tool only needs to be pulled); 3) behind (hoop,
or crook, surrounding object, but behind and not in contact so
that the tool only needs to be pulled); and 4) beside (hoop or
crook or stick, presented beside each other, so that the tool needs
to be brought into contact before it is pulled). It was found that
difficulty increased as follows: unbreakable contact, breakable
contact, behind, and beside. The four tasks in the “breakable
contact” and “behind” groups all required the samemotor action
(pull the tool), yet there was a significant difference in success
on them with the hoop in contact being significantly easier than
the crook behind. This suggests that the infant understands the
causal relation when two objects are connected and the physical
contact may help the infant to remember this. It is not likely that
the infant conceives of the connected objects as a single entity,
because perceptual similarity of the objects is a hindrance.
11) Fitting Shapes Into Slots (Peg-in-Hole Task): The task of
inserting a cylindrical peg in a cylindrical slot can be done by
almost 50% of infants at 12 months, but they do not pre-orient
the cylinder for insertion [128]. Instead, they press one end to
the hole, and then move the other end until they find the right
orientation. By 16 months, infants do pre-orient the cylinder,
but not other shapes, until later (see details on context specific
skills, Sections IV-C and IV-D). The 12-month-olds seem to use
the reduction in degrees of freedom (DOF) strategy described
in Section II-A. They first hold the peg in a fixed orientation
in the hand, and move the far end of it into contact with the
hole. This is a three DOF problem (which is very similar to
controlling the hand in a reach towards an object). The second
step is to orient the peg to be parallel to the slot, while pressing
it into the hole so that the end in contact with the hole main-
tains contact. This is a two DOF problem. The cylinder itself
has five degrees of freedom, but the sequential approach re-
duces the problem space. In each of the two steps, younger in-
fants try a large amount of variation (M2) before getting the
objects in the correct relationship. Repeated practice helps the
infant learn the correct orientation, and so the infant tends to
approach the hole with a gradually better pre-orientation in suc-
cessive trials. Some robotics approaches do insert a peg in a
hole in a similar two-step approach, using only a force feedback
sensor [129]. Reinforcement learning has also been applied to
learn peg-in-hole insertion using reactive control from force and
position feedback; this work showed a gradual improvement in
insertion skill somewhat similar to infants [130]. This approach
was also able to relearn its strategy when given a square peg.
This is similar to the robustness seen in infants; if difficulties
arise (e.g., due to a strange-shaped object), infants fall back on
earlier groping behaviors.
The cylinder is relatively easy as it can be inserted with its
cross section in any orientation. Shapes of noncircular cross-
section (e.g., triangular or rectangular) must additionally be ori-
ented so their cross-section matches the opening. Children are
remarkably bad at this task until about 26 months [128]. This
seems to reveal something about the object representations they
are using (see Section VI). In addition, insertion of disks in slots
shows that 18-month-olds fail to preorient, even though they can
well pre-orient their hand for insertion in a slot [131], showing
context specificity of representations.
12) Objects With Handles: McCarty et al. [132] studied how
infants deal with an object with a handle, and in particular, what
way they grasp it. The infant experiments were done with a
spoon preloaded with food and toys with a handle (bell, rattle,
cow, and pig). Each object has a handle and a goal-end (e.g.,
the goal-end is the bowl of the spoon or the toy). Three different
grasps were categorized as shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. (a) Grasp the handle with the thumb towards the goal-end of the ob-
ject (called radial grip). (b) Grasp the goal-end itself (called goal-end grip). (c)
Grasp the handle with thumb towards the non-goal-end (called ulnar grip).
This study looked at how infants develop the ability to use the
radial grip [see Fig. 4(a)] at the start of the task. Infants develop
this ability only gradually. We are not aware of any robotic work
that models this development; most robotic work tends to give
the robot the knowledge to grasp correctly from the outset [133].
In McCarty et al.’s study the preferred hand of the infants
was identified in a pre-test. In the results 67% (for toys) to 70%
(for spoons) of grasps used the preferred hand. The objects were
presented to 9-14- and 19-month-old infants, on a stand, with
the handle alternately oriented to the left and right; trials could
then be categorized as easy if the object was presented in an
orientation that would allow an overhand grasp with the pre-
ferred hand to achieve a radial grip (otherwise it was difficult;
i.e., an overhand grasp with the preferred hand would achieve
an ulnar grip). The most interesting results then concern how
the infant dealt with the difficult case: 9-month-olds tended to
use any of the three grasps indiscriminately; when they used
a nonradial grip, they often (more than half of trials) put the
handle in their mouth, and typically corrected afterwards. Four-
teen-month-olds were less likely to grasp the goal-end and more
likely to use an ulnar grip; however, when they used a nonra-
dial grip they never put the handle in the mouth; instead they
corrected either by rotating the wrist awkwardly, or changing
to the other hand. Nineteen-month-olds used the radial grip on
86% of difficult trials, which meant that they had to suppress
the tendency to use their preferred hand and use the other in-
stead (see also [134] for the training experience that accelerates
this).
Following from these results, the authors formulated a model
of the development of planning in this task: 1) Feedback-based
strategy–after an indiscriminate grasp the end of the spoon near
the thumb is brought to the mouth first, and if this turns out to be
the wrong end, then a correction is made and the other end put in
the mouth; 2) Partially planned strategy–as soon as the spoon
has been grasped its orientation is noted, and if it is incorrect
an adjustment is made before bringing it to the mouth (this en-
tails inhibiting the preference to bring it straight to the mouth);
and 3) Fully planned strategy–the orientation of the spoon is
noted before grasping and a grasp, which is appropriate to the
goal of feeding, is selected. This model predicts that infants’ ac-
tions should be slower when planning is taking place; some evi-
dence for this was found in that the action of bringing the spoon
to the mouth, when the ulnar grip had been used, was slower
in 14-month-olds than in 9-month-olds [132]. Overall, we see
a striking lack of planning at the earlier ages, which is inline
with the idea that behavior is more affordance-based before the
second year (see Section II-B); i.e., an affordance-to-grasp sug-
gests itself and is immediately acted on without regard for later
steps.
Further work has shown that the radial grasp generalizes to
other tools with self-directed goals (e.g., hairbrush on self),
but not to other-directed goals (spoon to feed a toy lion, hair-
brush to brush toy, hammer to object) [135]. This reinforces
the ideas about the context specificity of knowledge (see
Sections IV-C and IV-D). From a computational point of view,
it suggests that the infant is not applying the same generic
planning framework for both tasks. Instead, it is likely that
composition (M5) has been applied to produce a composite
schema for grasping and taking the tool to the head (in the
self-directed tasks). No such schema exists for other-directed
tasks. We suspect that developments on the abstract track (see
Fig. 1) are necessary before the common deep structure in such
tasks is obvious to the child (see Section VI).
D. Tool Use Example: Transport Using a Spoon and Bowl
Many of the behaviors described so far have been building
up the necessary knowledge for tool use by understanding
the properties of individual objects (see Section V-B), and the
effects of various actions on various objects in relationships
(see Section V-C). Self-feeding from a bowl using a spoon is
“proper” tool use and is common in human cultures. Connolly
and Dalgleish [136] studied two groups of infants longitudi-
nally, at monthly intervals; one from 12–16 months, and the
other from 18–23 months. They outlined four stages in the
development of this behavior: stage 1) repeating one part of the
feeding sequence, such as putting the spoon into and out of the
bowl, or into and out of the mouth; stage 2) performing the out-
line of the correct action sequence spoon-to-dish-to-mouth, but
not effectively loading food on the spoon or unloading in the
mouth; stage 3) effective performance of loading and unloading
within the sequence; stage 4) incorporation of correction rou-
tines (e.g., check if food has been successfully loaded, if not,
return to the bowl or pick up food that has dropped during the
transfer to mouth).
The behavior of stage 1 can be called play, where the goal of
feeding was not pursued, and the means is done for its own sake
(mechanism of repetition, M1); in addition, the infant would
sometimes pass the spoon from hand to hand, bang it in the dish,
or on the table, or drop it to the floor, or rub it against his/her
own head (mechanism of variation and selection, M2). Though
these activities were not directly in the service of feeding, they
did serve to increase the infant’s knowledge of these actions, and
their effects in the feeding context (this is the role of play, as de-
scribed in Section II-B). Sometimes goal-directed behavior was
observed, but there was a lack of understanding of the purpose
of the spoon: the younger children were sometimes observed
putting their spoon into and out of the dish repeatedly, while
taking food from the dish with their other hand. In the behavior
of stage 2, the younger infants did not seem to understand the
need to load the spoon. The behavior is learned by imitation (see
Section II-D), so they have some knowledge of the sequence of
the operations before understanding their individual purposes.
To effectively learn a component part, stage 3 is an example of
means–end behavior, which tends to follow the pattern of acci-
dental success leading to acquisition of the appropriate schema
(where M1 leads to M3), followed by intentional repetition with
variation and refinement (M1 and M2), and later understanding
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(see Section II-B3). The correction of errors in the sequence oc-
curs first for those elements at the end of the sequence, and latest
for those at the beginning of the sequence; e.g., by 18 months
the remaining errors are only in the earlier stages [137]; this is
probably due to the younger infants’ limits in general planning
abilities as noted in Section II-C.
In terms of the component skills, the authors outlined four
principal problems for the infant: controlling the spoon in the
hand, loading food on the spoon, taking it to the mouth without
losing the food, and unloading in the mouth. A number of
“behavior categories” were devised to code the observations
of the infants in various activities such as grasp employed,
trajectory to mouth, loading method, etc. Loading of the spoon,
for example, included 1) dipping-in motion (spoon lifted and
lowered, sometimes repeatedly); 2) side-to-side motion across
the dish; 3) scooping motion towards the infant; and 4) dropping
the spoon in the bowl and sometimes picking it up. Overall,
the results showed that younger infants had more varieties of
hand grasps, and less stable movement strategies; with age
came increasing consistency in the actions used (mechanism of
variation and selection, M2). Also the behavior categories used
changed; e.g., for loading the spoon, younger infants preferred
dipping-in, while older ones preferred scooping with a wrist
rotation, or the side-to-side motion (which was often effective
in trapping food against the side of the bowl) (see Siegler’s
changing strategies discussed in Section IV-C). The overall
pattern of movements became smoother and more direct, and
the time needed to perform individual components of the action
decreased (see modularization, M6). In terms of hand grasps,
older infants used fewer inappropriate grasps (e.g., ulnar grasps
are inappropriate because the arm gets in the way when trying
to bring the food to the mouth), and, furthermore, older infants
used more flexible grasps; flexible here means that the spoon
can be manipulated with finger movements, as opposed to a
rigid grip, which only permits wrist movement (these general
features are also seen in the progression from novice to expert
in adults [115, Ch. 4, 5]).
We also note a strong similarity with the task of learning to
drink from a cup [15, pp. 72]. Initially the child grabs the cup
and pulls it to the mouth in a single step. With practice, the child
slows this down and puts in a number of stopping points to re-
balance the cup so the liquid does not spill, and also adjusts the
head position, bringing head to cup, andmonitoring how the cup
is moving towards mouth (see decomposition, M4). With more
practice, it becomes a smooth motion where monitoring of the
level is done continuously during the motion (see modulariza-
tion, M6).
In this behavior, we see how the mechanisms of schema de-
velopment need to work together over a relatively long time to
eventually produce efficient spoon-feeding skill. We should also
point out that this task is relatively simple because it does not
require mental representation of unseen parts, which poses more
severe difficulty for infants (see, e.g., [138]). There does not yet
exist a computational model of this type of tool use develop-
ment. There is currently a large gap between what robots are ca-
pable of by developmental and nondevelopmental approaches.
For example, a nondevelopmental approach has been used to
produce a pancake-making robot, using a spatula and pan [133]
(a task which is well beyond young children), whereas one of the
more sophisticated developmental toolusers [139] merely learns
which of a set of given tools is useful for moving a hockey puck
towards the robot on a smooth table, and this when the tool is
already placed on the table. Of course, the developmental work
has advantages; e.g., it can autonomously rediscover how to
use a tool if it becomes partly broken, whereas the pancake-
maker lacks a mechanism for this. We believe that develop-
mental robotics is broadly heading in the right direction, by
focusing on mechanisms of development in simple tasks. We
should not be surprised that there do not yet exist developmental
robots that can acquire spoon use (a difficult task).
Having completed our description of the infant behavioral
studies, we can now reflect on how developmental robots
compare with infants (and what is lacking). Most of the ex-
amples of infant object–object behaviors described here have
not been attempted in robots in a developmental way, there is
more developmental robotics work on earlier behaviors such
as stereotypical movement (see Section V-A), or grasping (see
Section V-B1); it is important that future work links these up to
later more advanced behaviors. At present, most computational
models of the development of advanced behaviors implement
these as isolated episodes of learning, where the starting point
is largely handcrafted (see also models beyond infancy [11]).
Developmental robotics lacks examples of longitudinal devel-
opments, autonomously building on each other, as infants show
(also called “ongoing emergence” [140]). A notable exception
is the modeling of motor developments in early infancy by
shaping [141]; what remains to be tackled is the application of
similar shaping techniques to the development of object–object
behaviors. To implement this in robotics would require that
each learning episode builds object–object knowledge, which
forms a basis from which the next learning episode can begin
(without additional input from a programmer at that point). This
is closely linked to the issue of representational developments
(discussed next) and has not figured largely in developmental
robotics thus far.
VI. INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS (ABSTRACT TRACK)
This section briefly looks at changes in internal represen-
tations (upper track, Fig. 1), using the observable ability to
transfer as a way to deduce what representations may be in
use. Transfer of specific skills to similar related scenarios or
objects is very important for robust tool use. The evidence
from Section V suggests that improvements in this ability
during development can be explained by increases in the world
knowledge within the system, rather than some generic devel-
oping “transfer ability.” We have seen from Brown’s study on
retrieval [126] (see Section V-C9) that children transfer very
well when they understand the causal relationships in the par-
ticular task; Brown has also shown that they do not transfer on
more abstract tasks where the relationships are not understood
according to any of their prior knowledge and therefore seem
arbitrary to them. This message is reinforced by a further study
of 3- to 5-year-olds [142], which points out that the ability to
transfer is not directly dependent on age, instead it is dependent
on the level of representation achieved; young children can
achieve a deep representation of causal relationships in tasks
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involving simple physical manipulations, and therefore can
easily transfer in these. Older children can achieve a deeper
representation in a wider variety of domains, and hence can
show transfer in more domains. Therefore, the observable
ability to transfer could serve as a proxy for deducing some-
thing about the unobservable internal representations. Using
this, we could say that representations seem to develop in (at
least) the following three ways.
A. Coarse to Fine
In some situations, infants generalize very well and immedi-
ately (for example, supports or sticks [2, Obs. 152, 160]). The
fact that these generalizations can happen immediately after the
skill is first learned suggests that the objects were already rep-
resented in the same way (e.g., a coarse representation of a long
object); once the skill is learned for one, it can generalize to
all. Sometimes infants over-generalize, e.g., scale errors [143],
[144], where behavior is generalized to objects of incompatible
sizes (such as a too large tool in a container), or the attempt to
insert incompatible shapes in holes; this again suggests a coarse
representation, which might ignore some details of shape and
scale, but which is strongly linked to functional use. The devel-
opment of representations seems to follow a path from coarse
to fine, with initial representations capturing rough shapes, and
the detail on objects only being gradually elaborated later.
B. Context Specific to General
In some situations, infants do not generalize well at all, for
example, in the way a spoon is grasped for self-feeding, or for
directing to another object (see Section V-C12), or placing the
hand in a slot versus posting a disk in a slot (see Section V-C11).
Much of an infant’s learning is quite task-specific. Examples of
lack of generalization suggest that high-level representation is
not that well-developed (i.e., the high-level similarity between
tasks is not apparent to the infant) and suggest that it is important
to spend an extended period focusing on task-specific learning.
This then needs to be followed by some process of representa-
tional redescription (M7), which can find a higher level abstrac-
tion common to a number of concrete behaviors. This higher
level may, for example, capture causal understanding of the be-
havior, and when it is achieved generalization in other domains
becomes possible, and understanding of demonstrated actions
becomes possible as well.
C. Integration of Fragmentary Representations
Kellman and Arterberry explain that “perception leads to
multiple representations that may be recruited for different
tasks” [19, pp. 262]. Part of the work of development is to
connect these up to produce more generic and reliable world
models. We have seen examples of this already in the con-
nection between haptic object representation and visual object
representation (see Section V-B5). Additionally, Kaufman
et al. [145] describe how the two separate visual processing
streams in the infant brain (dorsal or ventral) are responsible
for different tasks. The dorsal route seems to be primarily used
for knowledge related to grasping (a practical representation),
while the ventral is for representation and recognition of the
whole object; yet these must be integrated to allow grasp
knowledge to be associated with an object representation. It
may be at quite a late age (maybe 9 months [145]) that infants
can integrate the information from the two streams. Both before
and after this there is further evidence of integrating fragments.
Surprisingly advanced perceptual competences are shown by
4-month-olds in perceiving the 3D form of rotating wireframes
[19, pp. 168], yet this seems to constitute only a fragmentary
understanding of objects because they do not “complete” solid
3D objects until 6 months [146]. Even at 18 months, fragmen-
tary representations based on view dependent images and parts
of objects seem to be still in use, and then there is a period of
rapid change where 3D whole-object geometric representations
are built by 24 months [147]. The picture emerging from the
literature suggests that object representations may undergo a
long and complex developmental trajectory. At the same time,
we can see advantages of fragmentary task specific represen-
tations. They provide a simple space that is appropriate to a
particular task, and when another seems more appropriate it is
possible to switch representation (see also [148] on the need
for multiple representations).
VII. REFLECTION AND RECOMMENDATION
In this section, we first reflect on the psychological results
to summarize the salient points about how the overall devel-
opment works (see Section VII-A); we then formulate some
succinct guidelines for developmental roboticists who wish to
model similar developmental trajectories (see Section VII-B).
A. Reflection on Infant Development
In reflecting on the examples above we can see the two tracks
of sensorimotor skill and representation developing (Fig. 1).
From this we extract the following main ideas:
1) Innate Knowledge Is Fragmentary and Incomplete: In-
nate knowledge of the physical world seems to be given in a
fragmentary form; it is not given from the outset in the useful
form that an adult has, but rather the evolutionary endowment
seems to provide constraints and boosts for the development of
world knowledge at various times. It is given in a form that pre-
sumes a prolonged development process in concert with the en-
vironment. This can work in complex ways where the innate
fragments may be creating opportunities for the necessary en-
vironmental interactions (see Section V-B1) or providing frag-
mentary representations to bootstrap the development of knowl-
edge of objects (see Section VI). The fact that physical knowl-
edge is not given in a “final” form might be important to en-
sure that the knowledge eventually developed is linked to sen-
sorimotor experiences of the infant, and hence more practically
useful.
2) Infants Learn Slowly, But Thoroughly: Infants spend
months practicing individual actions in varying circumstances,
and gathering good knowledge about how to apply an action,
and its expected effects.20 We see this in the way that the
period dominated by affordance-based play must precede goal
directed planning (see Section II-B and also poor planning in
20This is compatible with the principle of “developmental gradualness” [104],
which describes “particular skills and abilities appearing initially in rudimentary
forms and in highly specific contexts, and then gradually becoming more com-
plex and wide-ranging over time.”
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Section V-C12), and furthermore, play may sometimes need
to resurface when perception-action knowledge is inadequate
(see Section V-C6). Expertise and flexibility on a task come
from extensive practice with the elementary actions comprising
the task. During this time (in addition to the environmental
circumstances varying), small variations are tried out, and the
effects of those variations are learned. Behaviors learned in this
slow manner are well grounded. This highlights the importance
of achieving robustness and variety for controlling elementary
skills, as these will come into play later when these skills may
be constituents of more complex behavior.
This slowness explains why we often see some (fortuitous)
success in a particular behavior before a fuller understanding is
achieved some time later (e.g., the support, see Section V-C3);
many complex skills are learned in a crude outline before
the constituent parts are properly refined (e.g., the spoon, see
Section V-D). The early generation of experiences through this
approach provides the training data that improve the behavior.
There is a link between this general slowness and the acquisi-
tion of physical world knowledge above (see Section VII-A1).
Piaget said “to understand is to invent” and so it makes sense
for the genetic “preprogramming” to only provide a fragmen-
tary outline, which guides the development of the knowledge; to
achieve a thorough understanding of the physical world knowl-
edge of it is necessary for the individual to gather significant
experience with the component fragments from which they can
then themselves build the necessary concepts (e.g., the building
of knowledge of objects, see Section VI). When the general rep-
resentations of objects and space are built in this way they are
more useful because they are so closely connected to the actions
that can manipulate them.
This process appears to be facilitated by a “schedule” for de-
velopment that forces more time to be spent on earlier tasks;
e.g., the fact that the pincer grasp arrives relatively late (see
Section V-B3) means that significant time prior to this is spent
on coarser grasps, where a coarser representation of objects is
adequate; (see Section V-B5 for the way in which perception
and actionmay help to bootstrap each other’s development); fur-
thermore, in language, acquisition of vocabulary proceeds very
rapidly once it starts, but it does not begin until significant in-
teraction with objects is complete.
3) Generalization Depends on Representation: The ability to
generalize and transfer to new situations is dependent on the un-
derlying representations in use, and sometimes infants are sur-
prisingly poor at this and seem to have knowledge that is locked
in context. We have seen in Section VI that in some cases some
of the early representations facilitate certain types of transfer
(e.g., the stick), but in other cases the ability to transfer ap-
pears relatively late because it takes a long time for new ap-
propriate representations to develop (e.g., handled objects, see
Section V-C12). The processes underlying this development are
hinted at in Section VI, such as representational redescription
(M7), see also Section VII-B2), but we know very little about
how these processes work. They seem to be slow processes that
come into play after extensive experience with more primitive
context specific representations (so there is a link between this
and the previous points).
Nevertheless, a lot of tool using behavior can happen without
the need for advanced representations of objects, which are in-
dependent of specific tasks. Task specific learning seems to ac-
count for most observations quite well. Popular perceptions of
the intellectual abilities underlying tool use sometimes overem-
phasize the notion of “sudden insight” and anecdotes of dra-
matic inventions may often turn out to have simpler explana-
tions on closer inspection; i.e., they may be minor generaliza-
tions from very similar behavior that was practiced extensively
[115, pp. 308], [28].
We conclude this reflection by asking: What are infants good
at and what are they bad at? They seem to be good at building on
what they know. Once they have acquired a skill, even crudely,
they will try it out in varied situations, and refine it and improve
it and specialize it for new situations that did not produce quite
what they expected (leading to robustness and generalization).
They are good at assimilating new results and relating them to
what they already know (provided there is some relation). They
seem to be bad at making big leaps to new tasks that do not
build on what they already know; there are tasks that are beyond
them at certain ages, and it can take several months for them to
acquire the necessary precursors before they can attempt them.
They are, however, good at innovation; when presented with a
task that is beyond them they will try a large range of strategies,
and even if they do not succeed, they may discover something
new through play.
B. Direction for Roboticists
This section offers advice for those who want to make tool-
using robots that have the kind of robustness and generalization
that children have (i.e., able to cope with changes to tools and
materials, and to find appropriate ways to do a job without ex-
plicit detailed instructions).
Despite our incomplete knowledge of how biological sys-
tems achieve tool use, we can outline how artificial systems
might be constructed to tackle the problem in a similar way.
Starting with a small set of innate sensorimotor schemas (see
Section V-A), a bootstrapping process can be initiated by which
new sensorimotor schemas develop through the interaction of
innate schemas with objects in the world (see Sections V-B and
V-C) by means of the six mechanisms M1–M6. In that process,
the preconditions and effects of the schemas are refined and be-
come more and more predictive. Eventually they can be utilized
by a planning machinery (which is to a large degree innate) for
the purpose tool use.
We believe that, when designing developing artificial cogni-
tive systems, for some aspects, it is acceptable to take artificial
shortcuts, but for others one should be more careful to closely
follow the biological approach. For both planning and social as-
pects it would seem acceptable to take advantage of the possibil-
ities artificial systems offer; i.e., a planning system can be made
available, and social demonstrations can be made directly avail-
able (through human-provided motions, for example) without
the need to observe or interact with a social partner. However,
both the schemas and the representations of the world, must de-
velop slowly and autonomously, and this should not be shortcut
by direct coding. To emulate this development, it is valuable
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for roboticists to attempt to emulate the tasks that infants re-
ally can do; this avoids making robots do overly sophisticated
things (which might lead the roboticist to use mechanisms that
are inflexible and not generalizable). For example, if starting
with behaviors achieved only at two years of age, one might
need to code advanced representations, and thereby miss out on
coding the processes that build those representations (missing
out on one of the core mechanisms of development).
To emulate the two tracks of development, as seen in Fig. 1,
the following is suggested.
1) Start With Few Schemas, To Get A Lot: We have seen that
a small number of sensorimotor schemas, when applied in the
world, can lead naturally, by means of the mechanismsM1–M6,
to a wide variety of schemas. The smallness of the initial set may
be important to simplify the state-space exploration in early de-
velopment, and the gradual process of additions may be impor-
tant to allow them to be well grounded. By “well grounded”
we mean that they must be refined through extensive practice in
varied situations. For roboticists, this requires us to build sys-
tems that can generate large amounts of varying and meaningful
experience and the patience to let the robot “play” for a long
time.
2) Representations Must Develop Gradually: The cogni-
tive architecture must allow representations to develop (see
Section VI), by processes such as representational redescription
(M7), in order to facilitate generalization and transfer. The
system may use unsophisticated representations in the early
stages of development (e.g., simple internal reproduction of
perceptions with little abstraction). There must then be an
ongoing process of upgrading the representations in use so as
to capture more generic and abstract world knowledge. This
is likely to require some scaffolding in the form of certain
innate representational fragments that help the system generate
more sophisticated representations, as in the human case (see
Section VI). This must be a gradual process; if overly advanced
representations are designed at an early stage, then there is
a danger that they will be inflexible and nonextensible. For
this reason, we should not expect the early system to perform
advanced tasks; it must spend a long time on simple tasks.
3) Interaction Between the Concrete and Abstract Tracks: A
particular challenge is to establish mechanisms such as repre-
sentational redescription (M7) that allow development on the
abstract track, while also synchronizing with the concrete track.
This requires an ongoing modification and refinement of in-
ternal representations through the experience provided by the
sensorimotor schemas and the adaptation of these schema to the
restructured internal knowledge representation. This is a very
complex task since it is very difficult to observe the change of
internal representations. Establishing such processes in devel-
oping robot systems can actually help to understand this (for two
examples and a more detailed discussion, see [13]). To model
development on (and interaction between) the two tracks, it is
clear that both symbolic and sub-symbolic representations are
necessary; a key open question is what techniques should be
used to bridge the gap between these two; we see various pro-
posals in recent work [37], [58], [149].
4) Guiding Examples and Benchmarks for Development: We
provided a general outline of the development of sensorimotor
schemas of infants (see Fig. 2) as well as a number of concrete
stages of development in solving certain tasks. In particular, we
have devoted considerable attention to object-object behaviors
(see Section V-C), which comprise a major portion of infant be-
haviors, and are clear precursors to tool use; we have identified
these object-object behaviors as being insufficiently explored in
developmental robotics so far. The general outline given here
might serve as a guide for the overall developmental process to
be realized, and the concrete examples can serve as benchmarks
for truly cognitive behavior in artificial agents.
Reflecting on the development of tool use in infants as out-
lined in this paper we have noted the crucial importance of de-
velopments in perception and action capabilities, and the seam-
less progression between this and the beginnings of tool use;
this forces us to be keenly aware of the conceptual and tech-
nical hurdles still to be addressed in achieving the same in arti-
ficial systems. Nevertheless, we believe that it will eventually be
possible to design artificial systems that develop advanced and
stable tool use capabilities by equipping them with: 1) a small
initial set of sensorimotor schemas; 2) a suitable architecture in
which the mechanisms M1–M7 operate; and 3) large amounts
of experiences generated by applying the sensorimotor schemas
to objects in the world.
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